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Reconsidering the Constitutionality of Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines After Blakely: A Former 
Commissioner’s Perspective 
Michael Goldsmith..∗ 
Our cases have made abundantly clear that a defendant does 
not enjoy a constitutional right to a jury determination as to 
the appropriate sentence to be imposed. 
—United States Supreme Court.∗∗  
 
 
On June 24, 2004, the United States Supreme Court issued a 5–
4 decision that called into question the constitutionality of the 
federal sentencing guidelines. Blakely v. Washington ruled that a trial 
court’s upward departure from the penalty range ordinarily 
prescribed by state law deprived defendant Ralph Howard Blakely Jr. 
of his Sixth Amendment right to have a jury determine all facts 
essential to his sentence beyond a reasonable doubt.1 Observing that 
“[p]etitioner was sentenced to prison for more than three years 
beyond what the law allowed for the crime to which he confessed, 
on the basis of a disputed finding that he had acted with ‘deliberate 
cruelty,’”2 Justice Scalia’s majority opinion concluded that “[t]he 
Framers would not have thought it too much to demand that, before 
 ∗  Professor of Law, Brigham Young University. B.S. (1972), J.D. (1975), Cornell 
University. Professor Goldsmith served as a member of the United States Sentencing 
Commission from 1994 to 1998 and as vice-chair from 1996 to 1997. Professor Goldsmith 
expresses his appreciation to Professors G. Robert Blakey and James Gibson for carefully 
reviewing this manuscript. Professor Blakey served as chief counsel to the Senate Judiciary 
Subcommittee on Criminal Laws when federal sentencing reform first became an issue and 
Congress enacted a sentencing enhancement for Dangerous Special Offenders as title X of the 
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970. 
  Professor Goldsmith also wishes to thank the BYU Library reference staff (Ron 
Fuller and Galen Fletcher, in particular) for providing outstanding support. Additionally, Todd 
Jenson worked tirelessly researching and compiling an almost daily compendium of post-
Blakely cases. Finally, special thanks to Ellen Basian, Ph.D. 
 ∗∗ Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29, 49 (1995). 
 1. 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2538 (2004), reh’g denied, No. 02-1632, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 4887 
(Aug. 23, 2004). 
 2. Id. at 2543. 
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depriving a man of three more years of his liberty, the State should 
suffer the modest inconvenience of submitting its accusation to the 
‘unanimous suffrage of twelve of his equals and neighbours . . . .’”3
Blakely’s immediate impact proved to be more than a “modest 
inconvenience.” Because Washington’s determinate sentencing 
scheme contained features facially comparable to the federal 
sentencing guidelines, Blakely threatened the legal foundation upon 
which federal courts have sanctioned offenders since the Sentencing 
Reform Act of 19844 (“the SRA”) took effect. The decision 
provoked an “avalanche”5 of motions challenging the 
constitutionality of the federal sentencing guidelines, and judicial 
opinions nationwide characterized its effects as “cataclysmic.”6
The majority of federal district courts ruled that Blakely rendered 
the federal sentencing guidelines unconstitutional insofar as the SRA 
required judges to impose sentences based on facts beyond those 
 3. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *343). 
The reference to Blackstone is both ironic and inapt. Blackstone wrote during a period in 
which most felonies were punishable by death or banishment and the jury played no role in 
sentencing. See John H. Langbein, Shaping the Eighteenth-Century Criminal Trial: A View 
from the Ryder Sources, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 36–37 (1983); Jenia Iontcheva, Jury Sentencing 
as Democratic Practice, 89 VA. L. REV. 311, 316 (2003); see also infra note 168 and 
accompanying text. 
 4. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837, 1987 (1984) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551–
59 (2003); 28 U.S.C. §§ 991–98 (2003)). 
 5. United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508, 509 (7th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 73 
U.S.L.W. 3073, 3074, 2004 WL 1713654 (U.S. Aug. 2, 2004). 
 6. United States v. Croxford, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1230, 1232 (D. Utah 2004) (describing 
Blakely as “potentially cataclysmic”); see, e.g., United States v. Ameline, 376 F.3d 967, 973 
(9th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he Blakely Court worked a sea change . . . .”); United States v. Zompa, 
326 F. Supp. 2d 176, 176 (D. Me. 2004) (noting a “flurry of judicial activity surrounding the 
Blakely decision”); U.S. v. Shamblin, 323 F. Supp. 2d 757, 768 (S.D.W.V. 2004) (predicting 
that Blakely would create an “upheaval” in federal courts). 
The response from the legal community has involved even more colorful adjectives. See, 
e.g., Laurie P. Cohen & Gary Fields, Legal Quagmire: High Court Ruling Unleashes Chaos 
Over Sentencing, WALL ST. J., July 14, 2004, at A1; Dan Eggen & Jerry Markon, High Court 
Decision Sows Confusion on Sentencing Rules, WASH. POST, July 13, 2004, at A1 (“‘Blakely is 
like an earthquake’ . . . .” (quoting Professor Berman)); Carol D. Leonnig & Neely Tucker, 
U.S. Judge Cuts Farmer’s Sentence in Mall Standoff, WASH. POST, July 1, 2004, at A01 (“The 
Supreme Court decision [Blakely] . . . has been a bombshell for federal prosecutors across the 
country . . . .”); Adam Liptak, Justices’ Sentencing Ruling May Have Model in Kansas, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 13, 2004, at A12 (“The decision [Blakely] has caused ‘the legal equivalent of a 40-
car pileup’ . . . .” (quoting Margaret Love, former Justice Department official)); Christopher 
Smith, Hatch Exploring a “Fix” for Sentencing Turmoil, SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, July 14, 2004, 
at A1 (“turmoil”). 
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necessarily contained in the jury’s guilty verdict;7 the circuit courts, 
however, divided sharply.8 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
address this issue and, because of its importance, placed the matter 
on an expedited briefing schedule.9
As a former member of the United States Sentencing 
Commission, I viewed these developments with special interest and 
concern. The Supreme Court had sustained the constitutionality of 
the federal guidelines well before I became a commissioner in 199410 
and several times afterwards as well.11 Nevertheless, the post-Blakely 
fallout caused me to reexamine this issue. Although concerned that 
the Commission on which I had served might be found 
constitutionally untenable, I approached this reassessment buoyed by 
Justice Jackson’s historic display of wisdom in acknowledging error 
on a prior occasion: 
Precedent . . . is not lacking for ways by which a judge may recede 
from a prior opinion that has proven untenable . . . . Chief Justice 
 7. See United States v. Pirani, No. 03-2871, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 16117, at *31 n.5 
(8th Cir. Aug. 5, 2004) vacated for reh’g en banc, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 17012 (8th Cir. 
Aug. 16, 2004) (noting that a “vast majority of [district] courts read Blakely as applicable to 
the Guidelines”). Initial district court decisions almost unanimously ruled that Blakely rendered 
the federal sentencing guidelines unconstitutional as applied. See United States v. King, 328 F. 
Supp. 2d 1276, 1280 (M.D. Fla. 2004); United States v. Harris, No. 03-244-03, 2004 WL 
1622035, at *565 (W.D. Penn. July 16, 2004) (“[T]his Court has declared the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines unconstitutional under Blakely . . . .”); United States v. Einstman, 325 
F. Supp. 2d 373 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Croxford, 324 F. Supp. 2d at 1230. Contra United States v. 
Khan, 325 F. Supp. 2d 218 (E.D.N.Y. 2004); but see United States v. Emmenegger, No. 04 
CR. 334 (GEL), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15142 (S.D.N.Y. Aug 4, 2004).
 8. Compare Pirani, 2004 WL 1748930, Ameline, 376 F.3d at 980 (striking down 
guidelines as applied), and Booker, 375 F.3d at 515 (same), with United States v. Reese, No. 
03-13117, 2004 WL 1946076, at *4 (11th Cir. Sept. 2, 2004) (“[W]e decline to conclude 
that Blakely compels an alteration of the established view . . . [that the] minimum and 
maximum sentence[s] provided in the United States Code . . . [is] the only Constitutionally 
relevant maximum sentence.”); United States v. Koch, No. 02-6278, U.S. App. 2004 WL 
1899930, *2 (6th Cir. Aug. 26, 2004) (en banc) (“We now join . . . in determining that 
Blakely does not compel the conclusion that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines violate the 
Sixth Amendment.”); United States v. Mincey, 380 F.3d 102, 106 (2d Cir. 2004) (“[U]ntil 
the Supreme Court rules otherwise, the courts of this Circuit will continue fully to apply the 
Guidelines.”); United States v. Hammoud, 378 F.3d. 426 (4th Cir. 2004) (noting that Blakely 
does not invalidate sentences imposed under the Guidelines), aff’d, No. 03-4253, 2004 WL 
2005622 (en banc) (Sept. 8, 2004); United States v. Pineiro, 377 F.3d 464, 470–71 (5th Cir. 
2004) (declining to rule the guidelines unconstitutional and awaiting Supreme Court review). 
 9. United States v. Fanfan, No. 04-105, 2004 WL 1713655 (Aug. 2, 2004); United 
States v. Booker, No. 04-104, 2004 WL 1713654 (Aug. 2, 2004). 
 10. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989). 
 11. See infra Part IV.A. 
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Taney recant[ed] views he had pressed upon the Court . . . . Baron 
Bramwell extricated himself from a somewhat similar 
embarrassment by saying, “The matter does not appear to me now 
as it appears to have appeared to me then.” . . . And Mr. Justice 
Story, accounting for his contradiction of his own former opinion, 
quite properly put the matter: “My own error, however, can furnish 
no ground for its being adopted by this Court . . . .”12
If these pillars of our jurisprudence could confess error, surely I 
could candidly reexamine the legality of a sentencing system that I 
had helped to implement. This Article represents the product of that 
review. It advances the position that, notwithstanding Blakely, the 
federal sentencing guidelines are constitutional. Rather than focus 
exclusively on the Blakely majority opinion, this conclusion is based 
on both the full spectrum of Supreme Court sentencing precedent 
and systemic differences that distinguish the federal sentencing 
guidelines from Washington’s statutory scheme.  
Part I briefly describes the origin of federal sentencing reform 
and examines the oft-misunderstood relationship between the federal 
guidelines and mandatory minimum sentences. Part II.A explains 
how institutional tensions between the legislative and judicial 
branches of the federal government may have contributed to the 
Blakely controversy; Part II.B sets forth the legal grounds underlying 
Blakely and discusses a high-profile district court decision illustrative 
of many of the opinions applying Blakely to the federal sentencing 
guidelines. Part III reviews Supreme Court precedent upholding the 
constitutionality of various federal guideline provisions and 
concludes, based on more than a decade of Supreme Court 
jurisprudence, that structural and other differences distinguish the 
federal guidelines from the Washington statutes found problematic 
in Blakely. For those who look forward to the Supreme Court 
striking down the guidelines under Blakely, Part IV considers life 
 12. McGrath v. Kristensen, 340 U.S. 162, 178 (1950) (Jackson, J., concurring) 
(footnotes omitted). Justice Jackson further elaborated: 
Perhaps Dr. Johnson really went to the heart of the matter when he explained a 
blunder in his dictionary—“Ignorance, sir, ignorance.” But an escape less self-
deprecating was taken by Lord Westbury, who, it is said, rebuffed a barrister’s 
reliance upon an earlier opinion of his Lordship: “I can only say that I am amazed 
that a man of my intelligence should have been guilty of giving such an opinion.” If 
there are other ways of gracefully and good-naturedly surrendering former views to 
a better considered position, I invoke them all. 
Id. 
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without the federal sentencing guidelines. It suggests that Congress 
would probably fill the void with a strict regime of mandatory 
minimum sentences likely to make critics of the current federal 
system wax nostalgic for “the good old days” of guideline 
sentencing.  
Notwithstanding the many post-Blakely decisions that have 
declared the federal guidelines unconstitutional as applied, the 
Supreme Court’s resolution of this issue remains uncertain. As at 
least one federal judge has observed in addressing post-Blakely issues, 
in law almost nothing is a “sure thing”: 
The predictions of the Guidelines’ demise are many and they may 
well be true. It is difficult to read Blakely and not see the same 
wrecking ball heading directly for the sentencing features of the 
[Sentencing Reform] Act of 1984. But predictions don’t always 
hold; even sure things sometimes surprise us. Just last October, 
thousands of Chicago Cubs fans were certain of their team’s first 
World Series appearance in ninety-five years, with a mere five outs 
to make against the Florida Marlins. Then one of the Cubs’ own 
fans interfered with the catch of a foul ball, and the unraveling 
began. . . . [T]he Sentencing Guidelines may similarly defy . . . 
expectations . . . . A distinction, however fine, may be drawn 
between the[m] . . . and the State of Washington’s Guidelines. 
Other issues could become involved. . . . And so on.13
With this in mind, I set out to explain why the federal guidelines’ 
constitutional critics will likely meet the same fate as fans of the 
Chicago Cubs. 
I. FEDERAL SENTENCING REFORM LIMITS JUDICIAL DISCRETION 
Prior to 1984, federal judges enjoyed wide discretion in 
sentencing offenders.14 A judge could impose any punishment within 
the statutory maximum and still stand virtually immune from 
appellate review.15 Unlimited judicial discretion, however, produced 
unwarranted disparities—both nationwide and even within judicial 
districts—in sentences imposed upon similarly situated offenders.16 
 13. United States v. Olivera-Hernandez, 328 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1185 (D. Utah 2004).
 14. See, e.g., Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 363. 
 15. Id. at 364 (noting that sentencing determinations received “virtually unconditional 
deference on appeal”). 
 16. Id. at 366; see, e.g., Anthony Partridge & William B. Eldridge, The Second Circuit 
Sentencing Study: A Report to the Judges 1–3 (1974) (stating “the absence of consensus is the 
1GOL3-FIN 11/18/2004 12:08 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  2004 
940 
 
For a nation grounded in equal justice, this situation proved 
intolerable. After extensive review, Congress responded by enacting 
the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.17
The SRA had two goals: (1) removing unwarranted disparities in 
sentencing, and (2) producing “truth in sentencing” by eliminating 
parole, which had allowed most violators to serve only one-third of 
their sentences.18 The SRA also established the United States 
Sentencing Commission as an independent agency within the judicial 
branch.19 Congress directed the Commission to produce a 
sentencing system that would curtail judicial discretion. The new 
system would provide an imprisonment range for each crime subject 
to adjustments only for the crime’s severity, the offender’s criminal 
history, and relatively few extraordinary circumstances.20
norm” among district judges), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 98 Stat. 3182, 3225–26; S. 
REP. NO. 98-223, at 33–62 (1983) (finding sentencing disparities “shameful”); see also William 
Wilkins, et al., The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984: A Bold Approach to the Unwarranted 
Sentencing Disparity Problem, 2 CRIM. L.F. 355, 357–64 (1991) (reviewing the history of 
sentencing disparity). 
 17. See S. REP. NO. 98-223, at 33–62 (1983). After reviewing extensive evidence of 
disparate sentencing and parole practices nationwide, the report concluded: 
  The shameful disparity in criminal sentences is a major flaw in the existing 
criminal justice system, and makes it clear that the system is ripe for reform. 
Correcting our arbitrary and capricious method of sentencing will not be a panacea 
for all of the problems which confront the administration of criminal justice, but it 
will constitute a significant step forward. 
  The bill, as reported, meets the critical challenge of sentencing reform. The 
bill’s sweeping provisions are designed to structure judicial sentencing discretion, 
eliminate indeterminate sentencing, phase out parole release, and make criminal 
sentencing fairer and more certain. The current effort constitutes an important 
attempt to reform the manner in which we sentence convicted offenders. 
Id. at 62; see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A(3) (1988) (reviewing 
the process through which the Commission gathered information for development of the 
guidelines). For extensive background information about the policy and statistical 
considerations behind the SRA, see generally 52 Fed. Reg. 18046 (May 13, 1987); Brief for 
the Honorable Orrin G. Hatch, Honorable Edward M. Kennedy, and Honorable Dianne 
Feinstein as amici curiae in Support of Petitioner, United States v. Booker (U.S. 2004) (No. 
04-104); United States v. Fanfan (U.S. 2004) (No. 04-105) [hereinafter Senators’ Amicus 
Brief]. 
 18. See S. REP. NO. 98-225 (1983), at 38, 56, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 
Stat.) 3182, 3221–22, 3239; 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (2000). 
 19. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 368 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (1982)). 
 20. Id. at 374–77; see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 3 (1988) 
(providing adjustments for, inter alia, hate crimes, crimes against public officials, crimes in 
which the defendant abused a position of trust, obstruction of justice, and other extraordinary 
circumstances). 
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Based on a comprehensive review of prior federal sentencing 
patterns for virtually every crime in the federal code, nationwide 
hearings, extensive additional public comment, and numerous staff 
studies, the Commission promulgated sentencing guidelines that 
took effect in 1987.21 The guidelines established a base offense level 
for most federal crimes and authorized adjustments based on specific 
offense characteristics (reflecting the magnitude of the crime itself 
and the manner in which it occurred) and the defendant’s criminal 
history.22 After accounting for these adjustments, the guidelines 
produce a final offense level containing a sentencing range within 
which the court ordinarily must impose sentence.23
Despite their statutory designation as “guidelines,” the 
guidelines had a mandatory effect. Once a court determined the final 
offense level for the crime of conviction, the SRA required federal 
judges ordinarily to sentence within offense level’s corresponding 
penalty range24—the SRA permitted judges to depart from this range 
only if “there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a 
kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the 
Sentencing Commission.”25
Notwithstanding the federal guidelines’ mandatory effect, it is 
important to distinguish them from statutes imposing mandatory 
minimum sentences. Mandatory minimums, which have become 
increasingly popular with crime control legislators,26 represent 
 21. 1988 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N ANN. REP. 1; see also U.S. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 1, pt. A2 (1990). 
  The Commission’s initial guidelines were submitted to Congress on April 13, 
1987. After the prescribed period of congressional review, the guidelines took effect 
on November 1, 1987, and apply to all offenses committed on or after that date. . . . 
  The initial sentencing guidelines and policy statements were developed after 
extensive hearings, deliberation, and consideration of substantial public comment. 
Id.; see also U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SUPPLEMENTARY REP. ON THE INITIAL GUIDELINES 
AND POLICY STATEMENTS, ch. 2 (June 18, 1997).  
 22. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1–1.7. 
 23. See id. at 111–12 (providing the sentencing table used to determine the guideline 
range). 
 24. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3551 (1984)). 
 25. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b). 
 26. For example, one article notes: 
  Even the guidelines weren’t tough enough for many members of Congress. So 
on occasion over the past two decades, Congress has passed laws setting mandatory 
minimum sentences for specific crimes, especially those involving drugs. In those 
cases, judges have absolutely no discretion. The mandatory-minimum laws are 
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everything that sentencing guidelines are not. Rather than impose 
punishment after considering all of the various factors underlying the 
crime and the criminal, mandatory minimums impose an automatic 
minimum penalty based on the presence of one or two factors that 
the legislature deems especially pernicious (e.g., use of a weapon or 
distribution of a particular quantity and type of drug, such as five 
grams of crack cocaine).27 In contrast, the federal guidelines 
individualize each sentence according to the offender’s criminal 
history and the way in which the crime of conviction occurred.28 The 
final offense level contains a sentencing range designed to reflect 
these complex factors rather than just one salient feature.29
As statutory mandatory minimums trump any conflicting 
sentencing guidelines, the Sentencing Commission has always 
structured the guidelines to conform to statutory mandatory 
especially popular in election years, when legislators can use them as evidence that 
they are tough on crime. 
Laurie P. Cohen & Gary Fields, Legal Quagmire: High Court Ruling Unleashes Chaos over 
Sentencing, WALL ST. J., July 14, 2004, at A1; see Brian D. Boreman, Campbell v. Georgia: 
Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Survives Separation of Power Attacks, Remaining a Viable 
Option for the Legislature in Its War on Crime, 17 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 637, 641 (2001) (noting 
the popular pressure on state legislatures to enact mandatory minimum sentencing legislation); 
see also Ian Weinstein, Fifteen Years After the Federal Sentencing Revolution: How Mandatory 
Minimums Have Undermined Effective and Just Narcotics Sentencing, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
87 (2003) (reviewing the recent rise in mandatory minimum sentencing in federal narcotics 
laws); Families Against Mandatory Minimums, Sensenbrenner Bill Pushes for More, Tougher 
Federal Mandatory Minimum Sentences; Action Needed to Stop Bill from Advancing, at 
http://www.famm.org/si_federal_sentencing_sensenbrenner_06_29_04.htm (last visited Sept. 
21, 2004); Defending America’s Most Vulnerable: Safe Access to Drug Treatment and Child 
Protection Act of 2004, H.R. 4547, 108th Cong. (2004). 
 27. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SPEC. REP. TO CONG.: MANDATORY MINIMUM 
PENALTIES IN THE FED. CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 4, 28 (1991) [hereinafter MANDATORY 
MINIMUM PENALTIES REPORT]. As of 2003, approximately sixty percent of drug cases 
involved mandatory minimum sentences. LINDA D. MAXFIELD, UNITED STATES SENTENCING 
COMMISSION, OFFICE OF POLICY ANALYSIS, FINAL REPORT—SURVEY OF ARTICLE III JUDGES 
ON THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES 4 (2003), available at http://www.ussc.gov/ 
judsurv/jsfull.pdf [hereinafter COMMISSION 2003 SURVEY]. As Chief Justice Rehnquist 
observed: “One of the best arguments against any more mandatory minimums, and perhaps 
against some of those that we already have, is that they frustrate the careful calibration of 
sentences, from one end of the spectrum to the other, which the Sentencing Guidelines were 
intended to accomplish.” Hearing Before the House Reform Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, 
Drug Policy and Human Res., 106th Cong. (2000) (statement of John R. Steer, Member and 
Vice-Chair of the U.S. Sentencing Comm.) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Remarks of Chief Justice, Nat’l Symposium on Drugs and Violence in Amer., June 18, 1993) 
[hereinafter Statement of John R. Steer]. 
 28. See MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES REPORT, supra note 27, at 20–27. 
 29. Id. 
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minimum terms.30 Thus, many of the harsh penalties contained in 
the guidelines represent congressional mandatory minimums rather 
than Commission policy.31 Indeed the Commission has repeatedly 
opposed mandatory minimums and was responsible for “safety valve” 
legislation, which provided some relief against mandatory minimum 
sentencing.32
In contrast to statutory mandatory minimums, the federal 
sentencing guidelines attempt to ensure that each individualized 
punishment fits the underlying crime. However, at least initially after 
the guidelines’ inception, federal judges did not see it that way. 
When the guidelines took effect in 1987, most federal judges 
criticized the new system as unduly rigid and mechanistic.33 Their 
views provided fertile grounds for the first challenges to the federal 
guidelines’ constitutionality. 
II. SENTENCING WARS: THE JUDICIARY STRIKES BACK 
The judiciary’s initial response to Blakely cannot be fully 
understood in isolation. Although Congress established the 
Sentencing Commission as an independent agency within the judicial 
branch,34 neither Congress nor the judiciary completely accepted the 
sentencing guidelines. At different times, both of these branches of 
government attempted to override the Sentencing Commission’s 
authority. The judges initially reacted to their loss of control by 
 30. See id. at 29. 
 31. See, e.g., Frank O. Bowman, The Quality of Mercy Must Be Restrained and Other 
Lessons on Learning to Love the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 679, 744. 
 32. See Statement of John R. Steer, supra note 27, at 4–6 (summarizing Commission 
concerns with mandatory minimums and explaining the operation of safety valves). The 
Commission lobbied Congress for passage of safety valve legislation providing an exception to 
some mandatory minimum sentences. Telephone Interview with Donald A. Purdy, former 
Deputy General Counsel, U.S. Sentencing Commission (Sept. 14, 2004). Among other things, 
the Commission submitted a draft proposal that became the basis for the law as enacted. Id. 
 33. See, e.g., United States v. Tolbert, 682 F. Supp. 1517, 1524 (D. Kan. 1988) (“[T]he 
sentencing guidelines promulgated by the United States Sentencing Commission place rigid 
restrictions upon the discretion of the sentencing judge.”); United States v. Elliott, 684 F. 
Supp. 1535, 1541 (D. Colo. 1988) (describing guidelines as “mechanistic”); United States v. 
Russell, 685 F. Supp. 1245, 1248–49 (N.D. Ga. 1988), vacated and remanded by 880 F.2d 
419 (11th Cir. 1989) (“The federal sentencing guidelines . . . place rigid restrictions on the 
discretion of the sentencing judge. They reduce the role of the sentencing judge to filling in 
the blanks and applying a rigid, mechanical formula.”). 
 34. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 393 (1989). 
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invalidating the guidelines.35 The Supreme Court rejected these 
rulings,36 but Congress increasingly attempted to assert control over 
sentencing policy by enacting sentencing directives for the 
Commission to raise penalties,37 by enacting more mandatory 
minimum penalties,38 and, ultimately, by directing the Commission 
to implement reforms to reduce judicial downward departures from 
the guidelines.39 To the extent possible, the Commission resisted 
these competing pressures40 and eventually began to win favorable 
responses from sentencing judges.41 As set forth below, however, 
competing pressures from Congress and the judiciary created a 
constant state of conflict in sentencing policy. Although Blakely was 
not necessarily the product of that conflict, these ongoing tensions 
may account for the district courts’ initial response to the Blakely 
decision. 
 35. See infra notes 42–44 and accompanying text. 
 36. See infra notes 45–48 and accompanying text. 
 37. Since 1994, this has become an increasingly frequent congressional practice. 
Chapter 2 of each U.S. Sentencing Commission Annual Report details specific congressional 
directives regarding sentencing policy. Annual reports from 1995 to present are available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/annrpts.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2004).  
For example, in 2001, the Commission made thirteen amendments based on 
congressional directives. 2001 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N ANN. REP. 9–10. By way of 
comparison, all of the amendments made in the years 1992 through 1994 were based solely on 
Commission-initiated studies. 1992 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N ANN. REP. 5; 1993 U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N ANN. REP. 5; 1994 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N ANN. REP. 5. In 1995, 
Congress rejected two proposed Commission amendments, but did not mandate any new 
amendments. 1995 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N ANN. REP. 5. In 1996, Congress directed the 
Commission to enact two amendments, 1996 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N ANN. REP. 13; and 
in both 1997 and 1998, Congress directed the Commission to enact four amendments. 1997 
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N ANN. REP. 7; 1998 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N ANN. REP. 8. 
While there were no amendments in 1999, 1999 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N ANN. REP. 7, 
Congress directed the implementation of seven amendments in 2000, 2000 U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N ANN. REP. 9. Finally, in 2002, the latest year for which the annual report is available, 
Congress directed the Commission to make three amendments. 2002 U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N ANN. REP. 7, 10. 
 38. Families Against Mandatory Minimums, History of Mandatory Sentences, at 
http://famm.org/si_history_of_mandatory.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2004). 
 39. See infra notes 60–74. 
 40. MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES REPORT, supra note 27. 
 41. See infra notes 55–59 and accompanying text. 
1GOL3-FIN 11/18/2004 12:08 PM 
935 Sentencing Guidelines After Blakely 
 945 
 
A. The Institutional Context Preceding Blakely 
Soon after the guidelines took effect, defense counsel attacked 
them on a variety of constitutional and statutory bases.42 Ironically 
(in light of Blakely), the argument that the guidelines’ fact-finding 
procedures violated the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial 
scarcely received attention.43 The district courts, however, embraced 
these alternative challenges, as more than 200 trial judges ruled the 
SRA and guidelines unconstitutional in whole or in part.44
Before the Supreme Court, however, the guidelines easily 
survived constitutional scrutiny. In Mistretta v. United States,45 the 
Supreme Court concluded (1) that the formation of the Sentencing 
Commission did not violate the separation of powers doctrine and 
(2) that Congress did not exceed its authority in delegating the task 
of establishing new guidelines to the Commission.46 With only 
Justice Scalia dissenting, the Court issued a broad ruling sustaining 
the SRA. The majority found that, “although the Commission is 
located in the Judicial Branch, its powers are not united with the 
powers of the Judiciary in a way that has meaning for separation-of-
 42. The main constitutional attack challenged the Sentencing Commission’s 
constitutionality based on separation of powers and excessive delegation arguments. 1988 U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N ANN. REP. 7–8. Defense counsel also contended that the guidelines’ 
infringement upon judicial sentencing authority violated due process. Id. at 9; see United States 
v. Dahlin, 701 F. Supp. 148, 148–49 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (summarizing cases); United States v. 
Boyd, No. 87-30025-01, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17091, at *6–7 (D. Kan. 1988) (discussing 
the due process right to present evidence and separation of powers); United States v. Brown, 
690 F. Supp. 1423, 1425 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (discussing due process and separation of powers); 
U.S. v. Landers, 690 F. Supp. 615, 618 (W.D. Tenn. 1988) (analyzing due process per 
interference with judicial discretion and separation of powers); United States v. Williams, 691 
F. Supp. 36, 38 (M.D. Tenn. 1988) (claiming that the Commission failed to comply with the 
requirements of the Sentencing Reform Act); United States v. Terrill, 688 F. Supp. 542, 545–
46 (W.D. Mo. 1988) (finding a violation of due process for restricting the availability of 
probation and improper assessment of a criminal history score); United States v. Franco, 691 
F. Supp. 1036, 1037 (E.D. Ky. 1988); United States v. Rivas-Hernandez, No. CR-88-56-T, 
1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4840 (D. Okla. 1988). 
 43. Indeed, one of the few cases to consider this argument characterized it as “folly.” 
United States v. Sheffer, 700 F. Supp. 292, 293 (D. Md. 1988) (noting also that “[t]he Sixth 
Amendment entitles a criminal defendant to a jury’s determination of guilt and innocence, not 
punishment” (citation omitted)). 
 44. 1989 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N ANN. REP. 11. 
 45. 488 U.S. 361 (1989). 
 46. Id. at 371, 374, 412. 
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powers analysis.”47 Based on extensive jurisprudence allowing 
Congress to delegate authority to federal agencies, the Court found 
that “Congress’ delegation of authority to the Sentencing 
Commission is sufficiently specific and detailed to meet 
constitutional requirements.”48
After Mistretta, however, federal district judges accepted the 
guidelines grudgingly at best.49 Judges resented the guidelines’ 
intrusion on their traditional discretionary authority to punish 
defendants within a wide sentencing range. Two major 
developments, however, softened judicial attitudes toward the 
guidelines. First, the Commission made concerted efforts to work 
closely with the Judicial Conference to identify and remedy those 
guideline provisions that courts considered most problematic.50 
Second, the Supreme Court’s decision in Koon v. United States.51 
strengthened the authority of district judges, pursuant to the SRA, 
to depart from specified guideline ranges in unusual cases. Koon 
instructed appellate courts not to apply a de novo standard of review 
to district court departure decisions.52 In typical cases, Koon gave 
appellate courts the power to reverse district court departures only 
 47. Id. at 393. Rather, the Court explained, “the Commission . . . is an independent 
agency in every relevant sense. In contrast to a court’s exercising judicial power, the 
Commission is fully accountable to Congress, which can revoke or amend any or all of the 
Guidelines . . . .” Id. at 393–94. 
 48. Id. at 374. Indeed, the Court also observed that “[d]eveloping proportionate 
penalties for hundreds of different crimes by a virtually limitless array of offenders is precisely 
the sort of intricate, labor-intensive task for which delegation to an expert body is especially 
appropriate.” Id. at 379. 
 49. See United States v. Lara, 905 F.2d 599, 609 (2d Cir. 1990) (“Many judges are 
unhappy with the Guidelines . . . . However, until Congress changes the law, which is its 
province, we must proceed within the reasonable parameters of the statute and the 
Guidelines.”); United States v. Aguilar-Pena, 887 F.2d 347, 353 (1st Cir. 1989) (“Judicial 
dissatisfaction alone, no matter how steeped in real-world wisdom, cannot be enough to 
trigger departures, lest the entire system crumble.”); see also Marcia Chambers, Prosecutors Take 
Charge of Sentences, NAT’L L.J., Nov. 26, 1990, at 13 (reporting that U.S. District Court 
Judge J. Lawrence Irving resigned over unhappiness with sentencing guidelines). 
 50. During the author’s tenure on the Commission from 1994–98, for example, 
commissioners met with the Criminal Law Committee of the Judicial Conference twice 
annually. On several occasions, members of the Criminal Law Committee testified at 
Sentencing Commission hearings concerning proposed guideline amendments. See Judicial 
Advisory Group Assists in Guideline Simplification Effort, GUIDE LINES, Aug. 1996, at 3 
(describing the formation of the Judicial Advisory Group, composed of one judge from each of 
the twelve circuits, to assist the Commission). 
 51. 518 U.S. 81 (1996). 
 52. Id. at 99–100. 
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upon finding that the district court abused its discretion.53 This more 
flexible standard of review shielded more departure decisions from 
reversal and restored an element of judicial discretion to the 
sentencing process.54
Taken together, these developments prompted federal judges to 
view the guidelines more favorably. For example, a 1996 survey of 
federal judges found that, on average, respondents felt that guideline 
sentences were about “just right.”55 This trend has continued. In 
2003, another survey reported that seventy-seven percent of federal 
judges believed that guideline sentences more often than not 
“provide[d] punishment levels that reflect[ed] the seriousness of the 
offense”56 and sixty-two percent responded that the guidelines more 
often than not provided “just punishment.”57 Additionally, seventy-
two percent of the respondents reported that more often than not 
“guideline sentences avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among 
defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of 
similar conduct.”58 Thus, although the survey also reported that trial 
 53. Id. 
 54. See Paul J. Hofer et al., Departure Rates and Reasons After Koon v. U.S., 9 FED. 
SENTENCING REP. 284, 284 (1997) (stating that Koon “appeared to be the most important 
development in the area of departures since implementation of the sentencing guidelines”); 
Abraham L. Clott, An Assistant Public Defender Responds to Koon, 9 FED. SENTENCING REP. 
25, 25 (1996) (“Only the most plainly illegal departures should fail [under Koon’s abuse of 
discretion standard] . . . .”). However, some circuits appear to have retained a strict standard of 
review, even in light of the Koon decision. See, e.g., United States v. Brennick, 134 F.3d 10 (1st 
Cir. 1998); United States v. Banks, 130 F.3d 621, 624 (4th Cir. 1997); United States v. 
Lathrop, No. 96-4904, 1997 WL 639332 (4th Cir. Oct. 17, 1997); United States v. Dethlefs, 
123 F.3d 39, 43–49 (1st Cir. 1997); United States v. Barajas-Nunez, 91 F.3d 826, 831–35 
(6th Cir. 1996); United States v. Weise, 89 F.3d 502 (8th Cir. 1996); see also Barry L. 
Johnson, Discretion and the Rule of Law in Federal Guidelines Sentencing: Developing 
Departure Jurisprudence in the Wake of Koon v. United States, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1697, 1746 
n.256 (1998); Ian Weinstein, The Discontinuous Tradition of Sentencing Discretion: Koon’s 
Failure to Recognize the Reshaping of Judicial Discretion Under the Guidelines, 79 B.U. L. REV. 
493 (1999). 
 55. Molly Treadway Johnson & Scott A. Gilbert, THE U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES: 
RESULTS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER’S 1996 SURVEY 19 (1997), cited in Michael 
Goldsmith & James Gibson, The United States Sentencing Guidelines: A Surprising Success, XII 
OCCASIONAL PAPERS FROM THE CENTER FOR RESEARCH IN CRIME AND JUSTICE, NEW YORK 
UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, 16–17 nn.111–12 (1998) (on file with the author). 
 56. Commission 2003 Survey, supra note 27, Appendix B, at B-1. 
 57. Id. at B-6; see also id. at B-11 (reporting that sixty-two percent of judges gave the 
guidelines average to excellent scores in evaluating their “achievements in furthering the 
general purposes of punishment”). 
 58. Id. at B-4. 
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judges would still prefer more discretion,59 as a group, they reported 
relatively high satisfaction with the guideline system. 
Given these favorable responses, why did so many district courts 
so quickly conclude that Blakely rendered the guidelines 
unconstitutional? Most of these cases focused on the broad language 
employed in Blakely.60 without fully examining critical features that 
set apart the federal guidelines from Washington’s determinate 
sentencing statutes. These decisions, however, may also reflect an 
almost institutional response to another major development in 
federal sentencing law: congressional enactment of the “Feeney 
Amendment” to the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools 
Against the Exploitation of Children Today (“PROTECT”) Act.61  
In February 2003, the Senate unanimously passed the 
PROTECT Act.62 Principally concerned with preventing kidnappings 
and establishing a nationwide notification system (the “Amber 
Alert”), this measure generated no controversy. In March 2003, 
however, Congressman Thomas Feeney proposed an amendment to 
“address[] long-standing and increasing problems of downward 
departures from the Federal sentencing guidelines.”63 Feeney’s 
proposal called for restricting downward departures in all cases to 
criteria that had been “affirmatively and specifically identified as a 
permissible ground of downward departure in the sentencing 
guidelines or policy statements.”64 The House of Representatives 
approved the Feeney Amendment 357–58 “without hearings or 
meaningful debate.”65
Passage of the Feeney Amendment, however, provoked 
widespread criticism from the federal bench, defense attorneys, and 
various public interest groups.66 This outcry prompted Congress to 
 59. See id. at B-5 (Responses to Question 9). 
 60. See supra notes 7 and 8. 
 61. Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 18, 28, 42, and 47 U.S.C.). The Feeney Amendment may be found at 117 Stat. 
667. 
 62. 149 CONG. REC. S2587 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 2003). 
 63. 149 CONG. REC. H2422 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 2003) (statement of Rep. Feeney). 
 64. Id. at H2420. 
 65. United States v. Ray, 273 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1162 (D. Mont. 2003) (quoting 149 
CONG. REC. S6708-01, S6711 (daily ed. May 20, 2003) (statement of Sen. Kennedy)), 
vacated, 375 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 66. See, e.g., Mark Hamblett, Federal Judges Attack Sentencing Restrictions: Judicial 
Conference Calls for Repeal of Feeney Amendment, 230 N.Y. L.J., Sept. 24, 2003. at 1 (“The 
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reconsider the Act’s terms. Thus, when the PROTECT Act went to 
conference to reconcile differences between the House and Senate 
versions, conferees reached a compromise that limited the most 
restrictive features of the Feeney Amendment to specified measures 
to protect children from crime.67 Nevertheless, judges resented the 
Amendment’s remaining restrictions, which required district courts 
to justify their departure decisions with a statement of reasons,68 
provided broader appellate oversight of downward departures,69 
limited composition of the Sentencing Commission to no more than 
three judges,70 directed the Commission to enact new guidelines to 
“ensure that the incidence of downward departures are [sic] 
Judicial Conference of the United States voted for a repeal of key provisions of the 
Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today 
(PROTECT) Act of 2003, saying the ‘new law severely limits the ability of trial judges to 
depart from the Sentencing Guidelines and requires reports to Congress on any federal judge 
who does so.’”), available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1063212079768 (last 
visited Sept. 21, 2004). 
Further, the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), National Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers, National Legal Aid and Defender Association, National Association of Federal 
Defenders, and Families Against Mandatory Minimums submitted letters to Congress stating 
“the recently enacted PROTECT Act (S. 151) effected broad and ill-considered changes to 
our federal sentencing system.” Letters to Senator Edward M. Kennedy and Representative 
John Conyers, Jr. (May 20, 2003) (encouraging the repeal of certain provisions of the 
PROTECT Act), available at http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/2cdd02b415ea3a64852566 
d6000daa79/departures/$FILE/JUDGES_Act_letters.pdf (last visited Sept. 21, 2004). 
 67. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 108-66, at 58–59 (2003); see also PROTECT Act, Pub. L. 
No. 108-21, § 401, 117 Stat. 650, 667 (2003) (specified measures codified at 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(b)(2) (2004)); United States v. VanLeer, 270 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1323 (D. Utah 2003) 
(describing the limited effects of the amendment). 
 68. “The court . . . shall state . . . the specific reason for the imposition of a sentence 
different from that described, which reasons must also be stated with specificity in the written 
order of judgment and commitment . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2); see also United States v. 
Jones, 332 F.3d 1294, 1300 (10th Cir. 2003). 
 69. “With respect to determinations under subsection (3)(A) or (3)(B), the court of 
appeals shall review de novo the district court’s application of the guidelines to the facts.” 18 
U.S.C.A. § 3742(e)(2003); see also United States v. Thurston, 358 F.3d 51, 70 (1st Cir. 2004) 
(“After the PROTECT Act, the statute requires de novo review not merely of the ultimate 
decision to depart, but also of ‘the district court’s application of the guidelines to the facts.’ § 
3742(e). If this court agrees that the decision to depart was justified under the guidelines, 
however, the extent of the departure granted by the district court is reviewed deferentially, just 
as it was prior to the PROTECT Act.”). 
 70. The PROTECT Act changed the wording of 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) from “At least 
three” of the members shall be federal judges to “Not more than three” of the members shall 
be federal judges. PROTECT Act § 401(n)(1), discussed in United States v. Schnepper, 302 F. 
Supp. 2d 1170, 1183 (D. Haw. 2004). Therefore, the law no longer guarantees the federal 
judiciary representation on the Commission. 
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substantially reduced,”71 and required the Attorney General to report 
to Congress whenever a sentencing judge departs downward.72
Notwithstanding the scaled-back version of the Feeney 
Amendment that became law, federal judges understandably viewed 
it as a frontal assault on the limited sentencing discretion they 
retained under the federal sentencing guidelines.73 Some opponents 
characterized the reporting requirement as akin to a judicial “black 
list,”74 which led at least one court to reject it “as an unwarranted 
interference with judicial independence and a clear violation of the 
separation of powers set forth in the United States Constitution.”75 
Viewed in this light, Blakey offered federal courts a means to reassert 
control over sentencing decisions.76 The Blakely decision admittedly 
contains broad language that seems to invite such rulings. 
 71. Schnepper, 302 F. Supp. 2d at 1181 (citing PROTECT Act § 401(m)(2)(A)–(B)). 
 72. This provision of the PROTECT Act never went into effect because a provision of 
the law allowed the Attorney General to avoid reporting to Congress, as required by § 
401(l)(2), if the office of the Attorney General submitted a report to Congress detailing the 
“policies and procedures that the Department of Justice has adopted subsequent to the 
enactment of.” the Feeney Amendment within ninety days of the PROTECT Act becoming 
law. PROTECT Act §§ 401(l)(1), 401(l)(3), discussed in Schnepper, 302 F. Supp. 2d at 1182. 
The Attorney General submitted this report to the relevant committees of Congress on July 
28, 2003. Id. 
 73. See United States v. Green, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11292, at *67 (D. Mass. June 
18, 2004) (noting the amendment’s impact on courts’ sentencing discretion and observing 
that “the judicial response to the Feeney Amendment has been uniformly negative”); see also 
Alan Vinegrad, The New Federal Sentencing Law, 15 FED. SENTENCING RPTR. 310 (2003) 
(describing the “storm of protest . . . from virtually every segment of the criminal justice 
community” in response to the Feeney Amendment); Edward Walsh & Dan Eggen, Ashcroft 
Orders Tally Of Lighter Sentences; Critics Say He Wants ‘Blacklist’ of Judges, WASH. POST, Aug. 
7, 2003, at A1 (“Some federal judges have spoken out forcefully against what many of them 
see as a congressional and Justice Department assault on their independence.”); Leonard Post, 
Videotaped Proceedings in Brooklyn and a Resignation in Pittsburgh, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 9, 2004, 
at 4, col. 1. 
 74. United States v. VanLeer, 270 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1324 (D. Utah 2003) (noting 
criticisms but questioning whether reporting requirement will intimidate judges). 
 75. United States v. Mendoza, No. 03-CR-730-ALL, 2004 WL 1191118 (C.D. Cal. 
Jan. 12, 2004). In reaching this conclusion, the district court characterized the legal provision 
in question as a “power grab by one branch of government.” Id. at *7. 
 76. This view, however, certainly does not explain all decisions striking down the 
guidelines. For example, Judge Paul Cassell stated: “The court takes no joy in finding serious 
constitutional defects in the federal guidelines system. To the contrary, the court believes that 
the federal sentencing guidelines have insured that federal sentences achieve the purposes of 
just punishment and deterring future crimes.” United States v. Croxford, 324 F. Supp. 2d 
1230, 1253 (D. Utah 2004). 
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Ultimately, however, the legal basis underlying Blakely does not 
provide grounds for invalidating the federal sentencing guidelines. 
B. The Basis for Blakely 
Blakely concerned a defendant who pled guilty to second-degree 
kidnapping, a class B felony for which state law provided a maximum 
penalty of ten years.77 Another statute, the Washington Sentencing 
Reform Act, provided a “standard range” of forty-nine to fifty-three 
months for class B felonies committed with a firearm (as Blakely had 
done).78 This statute authorized the sentencing judge to depart 
upward from the penalty range only if the court found “substantial 
and compelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence.”79 
Pursuant to this provision and a finding of “deliberate cruelty,” the 
judge imposed a sentence of ninety months.80
Based on its earlier ruling in Apprendi v. New Jersey,81 the United 
States Supreme Court held that the judicial process that produced 
Blakely’s sentence violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury 
determination of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt because the judge, 
rather than the jury, determined that Blakely committed the crime 
with “deliberate cruelty.”82 Prior to Apprendi, the Supreme Court 
traditionally distinguished between statutory elements and mere 
sentencing enhancements and applied Sixth Amendment protections 
only to elements.83 Although the Court had previously suggested 
that due process may require protections “to some degree, to 
‘determinations that [go] not to a defendant’s guilt or innocence, 
 77. Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2535 (2004). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 2535 (citing WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.120(3) (2000)). 
 80. Id. at 2536. 
 81. 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
 82. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2538. 
 83. For example, as Judge Gerard Lynch has noted: 
  The conventional wisdom before Apprendi, drawn in part from the Supreme 
Court’s decision in McMillan v. Pennsylvania and in part from the law of 
discretionary sentencing that predated the sentencing reforms of the 1980’s held 
that the elements of the charged offense needed to be proved to the jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt, but that factors that bore only on the sentence to be imposed for 
the offense, within the limits of the discretion confided to the courts, needed only to 
be proved to the satisfaction of the sentencing judge. 
United States v. Emmenegger, No. 04 CR. 334 (GEL), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15142, at 
*39–40 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2004) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Jones, 526 U.S. 
227, 232 (1999) (noting the distinction between elements and sentencing factors). 
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but simply to the length of his sentence,’”84 Apprendi for the first 
time explicitly extended Sixth Amendment protections to at least 
some sentencing fact-findings. The Apprendi Court viewed 
sentencing enhancements that increased the defendant’s penalty 
beyond the authorized statutory maximum sentence as “the 
functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense than the one 
covered by the jury’s guilty verdict.”85 Accordingly, Apprendi held 
that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that 
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory 
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”86
This holding was neither novel nor surprising, as no sentence 
may exceed the statutory maximum. Blakely, however, subsequently 
transformed the meaning of the term “statutory maximum.” 
Responding to Washington State’s argument that the trial court had 
sentenced petitioner to a term that fell short of the ten-year statutory 
maximum, the majority stated that “the ‘statutory’ maximum for 
Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose 
solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by 
the defendant.”87 Accordingly, Justice Scalia explained that “the 
relevant ‘statutory maximum’ is not the maximum sentence a judge 
may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may 
impose without any additional findings.”88 As the jury’s verdict alone 
did not authorize punishment beyond the statutory sentencing range 
for second degree kidnapping, Blakely’s penalty violated the 
Constitution.89
In reaching this decision, the Blakely Court acknowledged that it 
had previously sustained an indeterminate sentencing scheme in 
which the judge, relying upon extra-record facts and exercising 
unlimited discretion, imposed sentence within the maximum 
 84. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 484 (citing Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 
224, 251 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
 85. Id. at 494 n.19. 
 86. Id. at 490. 
 87. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2537. 
 88. Id. Justice Scalia explained: “When a judge inflicts punishment that the jury’s verdict 
alone does not allow, the jury has not found all the facts ‘which the law makes essential to the 
punishment,’ and the judge exceeds his proper authority.” Id. (citation omitted) (quoting 1 J. 
BISHOP, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 87, at 55 (2d ed. 1872)). 
 89. Id. at 2538 (“[I]t remains the case that the jury’s verdict alone does not authorize 
the sentence.”). 
1GOL3-FIN 11/18/2004 12:08 PM 
935 Sentencing Guidelines After Blakely 
 953 
 
established by statute.90 Such indeterminate sentencing systems 
inevitably entail implicit judicial fact-finding (e.g., so the court can 
determine its discretionary sentence). However, Justice Scalia’s 
majority opinion found indeterminate sentencing systems 
distinguishable because their fact-findings “do not pertain to 
whether the defendant has a legal right to a lesser sentence[,] and 
that makes all the difference insofar as judicial impingement upon 
the traditional role of the jury is concerned.”91 Thus, although 
indeterminate sentencing schemes expose defendants to far greater 
risks stemming from the broad exercise of judicial discretion, the 
absence of a formal fact-finding procedure apparently insulates 
discretionary sentencing systems from Sixth Amendment scrutiny. 
Although the Blakely Court noted that “[t]he Federal Guidelines 
are not before us, and we express no opinion on them,”92 the 
Court’s opinion contains language potentially problematic to both 
the guidelines and the constitutionality of the SRA. In addition to its 
apparent rejection of judicial fact-finding that exposes a defendant to 
an increased sentence, the Court’s opinion questioned the fairness of 
the federal system 
in which a defendant, with no warning in either his indictment or 
plea, would routinely see his maximum potential sentence balloon 
from as little as five years to as much as life imprisonment, based 
not on facts proved to his peers beyond a reasonable doubt, but on 
facts extracted after trial from a report compiled by a probation 
officer who the judge thinks more likely got it right than got it 
wrong.93
In response, the dissent argued that due process protects 
adequately against excessive enhancements when “the ‘tail’ of the 
sentencing fact might ‘wa[g] the dog of the substantive offense.’”94 
 90. Id. (“The judge could have sentenced [the defendant] to death giving no reason at 
all.”). 
 91. Id. at 2540. Justice Scalia also noted that “[d]eterminate judicial-factfinding 
schemes entail less judicial power than indeterminate schemes, but more judicial power than 
determinate jury-factfinding schemes.” Id. at 2541. 
 92. Id. at 2538 n.9. 
 93. Id. at 2542 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A),(D) (2000)); see infra note 148 and 
accompanying text. 
 94. Id. at 2560 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing McMillian v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 
88 (1986)); see also id. at 2542 n.13. 
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The Court, however, rejected this proposal as too indefinite to 
provide meaningful protection.95
Not surprisingly, the dissenting opinions warned that Blakely 
would render the federal sentencing guidelines unconstitutional.96 
Within days of the decision, their concerns proved justified as a series 
of district courts declared the federal guidelines unconstitutional 
insofar as they required judges to make postconviction factual 
determinations that increase sentences.97 Judge Paul Cassell’s 
decision in United States v. Croxford is perhaps best representative of 
these rulings.98
Croxford pled guilty to one count of child exploitation in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a). Based on a number of factors, the 
probation officer recommended various enhancements above the 
base offense level. After considering the reasoning underlying Blakely 
as set forth above, Judge Cassell concluded: 
A sentence may not be enhanced when doing so requires the judge 
to make factual findings which go beyond the defendant’s plea or 
the verdict of the jury. Given this rule, there is no way this court 
can sentence Croxford under the federal sentencing guidelines 
without violating his right to trial by jury as guaranteed by the 
Sixth Amendment.99
In reaching this conclusion, Judge Cassell also relied, in part, on 
the dissenting opinions in Blakely to reject the proposition that the 
federal sentencing guidelines are structurally or otherwise 
distinguishable from Washington’s unconstitutional statutory 
sentencing scheme.100
 95. Id. at 2539–40. But see infra notes 174–84 and accompanying text (criticizing the 
Court’s failure to consider a proportionality-based due process analysis). 
 96. Indeed, Justice O’Connor warned that “[i]f the Washington scheme does not 
comport with the Constitution, it is hard to imagine a guidelines scheme that would.” Id. at 
2550 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2560–62 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 97. See, e.g., United States v. Mueffleman, 327 F. Supp. 2d 79 (D. Mass. 2004); United 
States v. King, 328 F. Supp. 2d 1276 (M.D. Fla. 2004); United States v. Einstman, 325 F. 
Supp. 2d 373 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); United States v. Leach, 325 F. Supp. 2d 557 (E.D. Pa. 2004); 
United States v. Croxford, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1230 (D. Utah 2004); United States v. Medas, 
323 F. Supp. 2d 436 (E.D.N.Y. 2004); United States v. Shamblin, 323 F. Supp. 2d 757 (S.D. 
W. Va. 2004). 
 98. 324 F. Supp. 2d at 1238–42. 
 99. Id. at 1238–39. 
 100. Id. at 1239. 
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The Blakely majority’s broad language, together with the 
dissenting opinions’ warning of the guidelines’ imminent demise, led 
numerous other district judges to adopt the Croxford analysis.101 At 
best, however, these decisions were premature. The Blakely Court 
declined to address the constitutionality of the federal guidelines.102 
Moreover, before the Blakely decision, every circuit had ruled that 
Apprendi did not render the federal guidelines unconstitutional.103 
 101. See United States v. Grant, No. 3:03-CR-339-J-99MMH, 2004 WL 1803196, at 
*1–2 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 12, 2004); United States v. Marrero, No. 04 CR 0086(JSR), 2004 WL 
1621410, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 21, 2004); United States v. King, 328 F. Supp. 2d at 1276 
(M.D. Fla. 2004); United States v. LaFlora, No. 03-10230-01-WEB, 2004 WL 1851533, at 
*2 (D. Kan. July 16, 2004); United States v. Lockett, No. CRIM. 3:04CR017, 2004 WL 
1607496, at *2 (E.D. Va. July 16, 2004). 
 102. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2538 n.9. 
 103. See United States v. Goodline, 326 F.3d 26, 34 (1st Cir. 2003) (“The guideline 
calculations are not restricted by Apprendi’s rule . . . .”); United States v. Luciano, 311 F.3d 
146, 153 (2d Cir. 2002) (“We have repeatedly held that Guidelines ranges are not statutory 
maximums for the purpose of Apprendi analysis.”); United States v. DeSumma, 272 F.3d 176, 
181 (3d Cir. 2001) (“This Court has . . . concluded . . . that when the actual sentence 
imposed [under the Guidelines] does not exceed the statutory maximum, Apprendi is not 
implicated.”); United States v. Kinter, 235 F.3d 192, 200 (4th Cir. 2000) (“We conclude, 
however, that the Sentencing Guidelines pass muster under the Apprendi Court’s conception 
of due process . . .”); United States v. Randle, 304 F.3d 373, 378 (5th Cir. 2002) (concluding 
that a sentence based on facts admitted at trial supported an upward adjustment under the 
guidelines that did not exceed the statutory maximum); United States v. Helton, 349 F.3d 
295, 299 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[O]nce the jury has determined guilt, the district court may 
sentence the defendant to the statutory minimum, the statutory maximum, or anything in 
between, based on its (proper) application of the Guidelines and based on its (permissible) 
preponderance-of-the-evidence findings under the Guidelines.” (relying upon Harris v. United 
States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002))); United States v. Johnson, 335 F.3d 589, 591 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(per curiam) (concluding that Apprendi did not apply because the defendant’s sentence, 
decided under the guidelines, was “less than the statutory maximum prescribed by the statute 
of conviction”); United States v. Piggie, 316 F.3d 789, 791 (8th Cir. 2003) (“The rule of 
Apprendi only applies where the non-jury factual determination increases the maximum 
sentence beyond the statutory range authorized by the jury’s verdict..” (internal quotation 
marks and alteration in original omitted) (quoting United States v. Aguayo-Delgado, 220 F.3d 
926, 933 (8th Cir. 2000))); United States v. Toliver, 351 F.3d 423, 433 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(concluding that a district judge does not violate Apprendi when he does not exceed the 
statutory maximum); United States v. Mendez-Zamora, 296 F.3d 1013, 1020 (10th Cir. 
2002) (“Apprendi [, however,] does not apply to sentencing factors that increase a defendant’s 
guideline range but do not increase the [sentence beyond the] statutory maximum.” (internal 
quotations marks omitted) (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Sullivan, 255 
F.3d 1256, 1265 (10th Cir. 2001))); United States v. Sanchez, 269 F.3d 1250, 1288 (11th 
Cir. 2001) (“Apprendi has no application to, or effect on, either mandatory minimum 
sentences or Sentencing Guidelines calculations, when in either case the ultimate sentence 
imposed does not exceed the prescribed statutory maximum penalty.”); United States v. Fields, 
251 F.3d 1041, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“Apprendi does not apply to sentencing findings that 
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These decisions remain in effect until either the Supreme Court or 
individual circuit courts, sitting en banc, overrule them.104 Rather 
than await proper development of the issues at the appellate level, 
however, district courts often reached out to decide the guidelines’ 
constitutionality—occasionally without the benefit of briefing from 
the parties.105
To the degree that district courts relied on the Blakely dissents to 
declare the guidelines unconstitutional, their analysis is misdirected: 
“dissenting opinions are not always a reliable guide to the meaning 
of the majority; often their predictions partake of Cassandra’s gloom 
more than of her accuracy.”106 Indeed, Blakely’s dissenting opinions 
may have overlooked that the Supreme Court has previously 
expressed approval of judicial fact-finding—under a preponderance 
of the evidence standard—for sentencing enhancements under the 
Dangerous Special Offender law.107 Ultimately, a series of other 
elevate a defendant’s sentence within the applicable statutory limits.”); see also Blakely, 124 S. 
Ct. at 2547 n.1 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (collecting cases). 
 104. See State Oil Co. v. Kahn, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997) (“[I]t is this Court’s prerogative 
alone to overrule one of its precedents.”); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 207 (1997) (“The 
Court neither acknowledges nor holds that other courts should ever conclude that its more 
recent cases have, by implication, overruled an earlier precedent. Rather, lower courts should 
follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its 
own decisions.”); Gulf Power Co. v. FCC, 226 F.3d 1220, 1224 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[A] panel 
decision is the law of the circuit unless and until it is overruled by the Supreme Court or the en 
banc court.”); United States v. Washington, 127 F.3d 510, 517 (6th Cir. 1997) (“In the Sixth 
Circuit, as well as all other federal circuits, one panel cannot overrule a prior panel’s published 
decision.”); Phillip M. Kannan, The Precedential Force of Panel Law, 76 MARQ. L. REV. 755, 
755–56 (1993) (“[A]ll thirteen circuits, with the possible exception of the Seventh Circuit, 
have developed the interpanel doctrine: No panel can overrule the precedent established by any 
panel in the same circuit; all panels are bound by prior panel decisions in the same circuit.”). 
 105. In Croxford, the district court initially issued its order without the benefit of briefing 
from the parties. 324 F. Supp. 2d at 1250–51 (denying motions by both the prosecution and 
defense for continuance to brief the constitutional issues raised by Blakely). Afterwards, the 
United States Attorney’s Office submitted a “form pleading,” which argued “that the Supreme 
Court has previously upheld the constitutionality of the Guidelines and, until the Court holds 
otherwise, lower federal courts are bound by those decisions and, second, that the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines operate differently from the unconstitutional guidelines used in 
Washington State that were at issue in Blakely.” Id. at 1257. Judge Cassell rejected this filing as 
unpersuasive. Id. 
 106. United States v. Penaranda, 375 F.3d 238, 245 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Local 1545 
v. Vincent, 286 F.2d 127, 132 (2d Cir. 1960)). 
 107. In McMillan v. Pennsylvania, the Supreme Court stated: 
Sentencing courts necessarily consider the circumstances of an offense in selecting 
the appropriate punishment, and we have consistently approved sentencing schemes 
that mandate consideration of facts related to the crime without suggesting that 
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Supreme Court decisions sustaining the federal sentencing guidelines 
provides a more reliable guide to their constitutionality. 
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT: THE SUPREME COURT AND 
FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
Courts rejecting the guidelines have largely ignored other 
Supreme Court precedent, failed to fully consider important 
differences between the federal sentencing guidelines and the state 
sentencing statutes that Blakely found objectionable, and taken an 
unduly expansive interpretation of Blakely. For example, the 
Croxford court declined to impose an obstruction of justice 
enhancement upon the defendant, noting that the majority in Blakely 
apparently found that precise enhancement objectionable.108 
Whatever the differences between the Blakely majority and dissents 
on this point, however, the Supreme Court did not overrule its 
unanimous decision in United States v. Dunnigan,109 which 
those facts must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The Courts of Appeals have 
uniformly rejected due process challenges to the preponderance standard under the 
federal “dangerous special offender” statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3575, which provides for an 
enhanced sentence if the court concludes that the defendant is both “dangerous” and a 
“special offender.”  
477 U.S. 79, 92 (1986) (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (citing United States v. 
Davis, 710 F.2d 104, 106 (3d Cir. 1983) (collecting cases)).  
Although the Blakely Court limited McMillan to statutes that increase mandatory 
minimums, 124 S. Ct. at 2538, the now-repealed dangerous special offender law increased the 
statutory maximum and did not involve mandatory minimums. 18 U.S.C. § 3575 (repealed 
1984). Indeed, subject to a constraint against “disproportionate” penalties, the law authorized 
judges to enhance sentences as much as twenty-five years beyond the statutory maximum. 84 
Stat. 948, 949 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3557(b)) (repealed 1984) (emphasis added). The 
Judicial Conference of the United States endorsed this legislation. See H.R. Rep. No. 91-1549 
reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007, 4051. To enhance a sentence, the dangerous special 
offender law required the trial judge to make certain factual findings comparable to those 
required under the federal sentencing guidelines. For example, the law required a finding that 
the defendant committed a designated felony  
as part of a pattern of conduct . . . which constituted a substantial source of his 
income, and in which he manifested special skill or expertise; or . . . [was] a 
conspiracy with three or more other persons to engage in a pattern of [criminal] 
conduct . . . and the defendant did, or agreed that he would, initiate, organize, plan, 
finance, direct, manage, or supervise all or part of such conspiracy. 
18 U.S.C. § 3575(e)(2–3) (repealed 1984). 
 108. Croxford, 324 F. Supp. 2d at 1240 n.49, aff’d, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1255 (D. Utah 
2004). 
 109. 507 U.S. 87 (1993). 
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instructed sentencing judges to decide the facts pertinent to the 
obstruction of justice guideline enhancement.110
A. District Courts Have Ignored Controlling  
Supreme Court Precedent 
For the most part, district courts invalidating the guidelines have 
failed to address the substantial body of Supreme Court precedent 
sustaining the constitutionality of the federal guidelines since their 
inception.111 Starting with Mistretta v. United States in 1989, the 
Supreme Court upheld the guidelines’ constitutionality in the face of 
a broad challenge on separation of powers grounds. 112 Although 
Mistretta did not involve a Sixth Amendment challenge to the 
guidelines, the Court’s opinion carefully reviewed the origin and 
operation of the newly established guideline system, which, by its 
nature, required judicial fact-finding.113
Further, on two occasions the Supreme Court has broadly 
endorsed the guidelines’ relevant conduct rules, which potentially 
enhance sentences based on conduct beyond the actual count of 
conviction.114 These rules implement the Commission’s “modified 
real offense” sentencing system, which increases penalties based on 
certain real offense conduct underlying the offense of conviction.115 
 110. Id. at 95 (“[I]f a defendant objects to a sentence enhancement resulting from her 
trial testimony, a district court must review the evidence and make independent findings 
necessary to establish . . . obstruction of justice . . . .”). 
 111. See supra note 7 (collecting cases); see also, e.g., Croxford v. United States, 324 F. 
Supp. 2d 1230 (D. Utah 2004). However, in his subsequent opinion, in which he responded 
to briefing by the United States, see supra note 105, Judge Cassell did address Edwards v. 
United States, 523 U.S. 511, 512–13 (1998), United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 164 
(1997), Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 411 (1995), Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 
36 (1993), and Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363 (1989). Croxford v. United 
States, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1258–61 (D. Utah 2004). 
 112. 488 U.S. at 412. 
 113. Id. at 378–79 (noting that the Commission has relied on “the determination of facts 
and the inferences to be drawn from them in the light of the statutory standards and 
declaration of policy” properly to exercise judgment in establishing the sentencing guidelines 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 425 
(1944))). 
 114. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3 (2003). 
 115. Julie R. O’Sullivan, Symposium: The Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Ten Years Later: 
In Defense of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines’ Modified Real-Offense System, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 
1342, 1348 (1997). The Commission implemented its “modified, real offense sentencing” 
approach as a compromise between purely charge based and real offense based options. See 51 
Fed. Reg. 35,086 (Oct. 1, 1986); William W. Wilkins & John R. Steer, Relevant Conduct: The 
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The relevant conduct rules, however, are constrained by the 
authorized statutory maximum set by Congress for the offense,116 the 
elements of which are always found by the jury in its verdict. Thus, 
in Witte v. United States, the Supreme Court used the statute, rather 
than the guidelines, to identify the maximum penalty range for the 
offense. 117 Witte involved a claim that the Double Jeopardy Clause 
precluded prosecuting a defendant for conduct (trafficking 1091 
kilograms of cocaine) that had been the subject of a prior 
conviction’s relevant conduct enhancement.118 In rejecting this 
argument, the Court observed that the relevant conduct rules 
produced an increased guideline range that “still falls within the 
scope of the legislatively authorized penalty (5 to 40 years).”119
The Witte Court also noted that “[t]he relevant conduct 
provisions of the Sentencing Guidelines . . . are sentencing 
enhancement[s] . . . evincing the judgment that a particular offense 
should receive a more serious sentence within the authorized range if 
it was either accompanied by or preceded by additional criminal 
activity.”120 Put simply, the enhancement applies because the 
“offense was carried out in a manner that warrants increased 
punishment.”121 Accordingly, the Court held that “where the 
legislature has authorized . . . a particular punishment range for a 
given crime, the resulting sentence within that range constitutes 
Cornerstone of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 41 S.C. L. Rev. 495, 497–99 (1990); O’ 
Sullivan, supra, at 1349, 1352–61. Under this system, the offender is held accountable—and 
incurs an increased sentence—for designated harms that occurred either in connection with the 
offense of conviction or, in some instances, “that were part of the same course of conduct or 
common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction.” U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
MANUAL § 1B1.3(a) (2003). Under no circumstances, however, may the sentence exceed the 
statutory maximum set by Congress when it defined the offense. U.S. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5G1.1(1) (2003). See infra note 156 and accompanying text. Of 
course, the elements of the offense are always decided by the jury. 
 116. 28 U.S.C. § 994(a) (explaining that guidelines must be consistent with federal 
statutes); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5G1.1(1) (2003). 
 117. 515 U.S. 389, 399 (1995); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5G1.1(1) 
(2003). 
 118. Witte, 515 U.S. at 391. 
 119. Id. at 399 (emphasis added). The Court stated that “the uncharged criminal 
conduct was used to enhance petitioner’s sentence within the range authorized by statute.” Id. 
(emphasis added). 
 120. Id. at 403 (emphasis added). 
 121. Id. 
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punishment only for the offense of conviction for purposes of the 
double jeopardy inquiry.”122
In United States v. Watts, the Court even endorsed a guideline 
sentencing enhancement for relevant acquitted conduct.123 After the 
jury convicted defendant on drug charges and acquitted him on a 
firearms count, the trial judge “found by a preponderance of the 
evidence that Watts had possessed the guns in connection with the 
drug offense.”124 On appeal, the Supreme Court did not even permit 
briefing or full argument, and its per curiam opinion characterized as 
“novel”125 the view that a sentencing judge may not consider 
conduct encompassed by the jury’s acquittal. The Court observed 
that “longstanding” statutory and common law doctrine authorized 
a sentencing judge to consider a wide variety of information about 
the defendant,126 which “traditionally and constitutionally”127 may 
include acquitted conduct.128 The Watts Court concluded: 
 For these reasons, “an acquittal in a criminal case does not 
preclude the Government from relitigating an issue when it is 
presented in a subsequent action governed by a lower standard of 
proof.” The Guidelines state that it is “appropriate” that facts 
relevant to sentencing be proved by a preponderance of the 
evidence and we have held that application of the preponderance 
standard at sentencing generally satisfies due process.129
Adding his support for a procedure that necessarily involves 
judicial fact-finding, Justice Scalia concurred separately in Watts to 
 122. Id. at 403–04 (emphasis added). 
 123. 519 U.S. 148, 157 (1997). 
 124. Id. at 150; see also id. at 170–71 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (electing to dissent 
because the Court had not allowed full briefing or consideration on the oral argument 
calendar). 
 125. Id. at 154. 
 126. Id. at 151. 
 127. Id. at 152 (citing Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 747 (1994)).  
 128. Id. (citing United States v. Donelson, 695 F.2d 583, 590 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). 
 129. Id. at 156 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting Dowling v. United States, 
493 U.S. 342, 349 (1990); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6A1.3 cmt. (2003)) 
(citing McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 91–92 (1986), aff’d, 376 Pa. Super. 25 
(1988); Nichols, 511 U.S. at 747–48). The Court “acknowledge[d] a divergence of opinion” 
concerning “whether, in extreme circumstances, relevant conduct that would dramatically 
increase the sentence must be based on clear and convincing evidence,” but did not consider 
the situation before it to “present such exceptional circumstances.” Watts, 519 U.S. at 156–
57; see also McMillan, 477 U.S. at 92 n.8 (1986) (“[S]entencing courts have always operated 
without constitutionally imposed burdens of proof . . . .”). 
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emphasize his view that the Sentencing Commission could not 
reverse the Court’s decision “by mandating disregard of the 
information we today hold it proper to consider.”130 Thus, both 
Witte and Watts contemplated judges routinely conducting 
postconviction fact-finding in determining whether to apply 
sentencing enhancements within statutory limits set by Congress for 
the offense, the elements of which are always submitted to the jury 
for a determination of guilt consistent with all constitutional rights. 
Witte and Watts do not stand alone. On other occasions, the 
Supreme Court has reiterated its “traditional understanding of the 
sentencing process [as one] which we have often recognized as less 
exacting than the process of establishing guilt.”131 Thus, a series of 
Supreme Court decisions principally warns against sentences that 
exceed statutory limits—guideline increases within such limits have 
never warranted constitutional attention. 
For example, in Edwards v. United States, defendants challenged 
the trial judge’s authority to determine the type and quantity of 
drugs underlying a jury’s general guilty verdict. 132 On appeal, the 
defense argued that, given the general verdict, the sentencing judge 
“must assume that the conspiracy involved only cocaine, which . . . 
the Sentencing Guidelines treat more leniently than crack.”133 
Among other points, defendants’ briefs argued that holding them 
accountable for crack cocaine would violate their Sixth Amendment 
right to a jury determination.134
 130. Watts, 519 U.S. at 158. Justice Scalia explained that the Sentencing Reform Act 
requires the Guidelines to be “consistent with all pertinent provisions of title 18, 
United States Code.” [28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(1).] In turn, 18 U.S.C. § 3661 provides 
that “[n]o limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background, 
character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the 
United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate 
sentence.” 
Id. (emphasis added) (second alteration in original). 
 131. Nichols, 511 U.S. at 747. 
 132. 523 U.S. 511, 513 (1998). The jury instructions at issue allowed the jury to convict 
on finding a conspiracy to distribute either cocaine or crack, but the judge imposed sentence as 
if both drugs were involved. The defendants challenged the sentence because the jury could 
have intended to find only cocaine. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. See Brief for Petitioners at 7–8, Edwards v. United States, 523 U.S. 511 (1998) 
(No. 96-8732). 
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In rejecting this argument, the Court apparently endorsed both 
the guidelines’ relevant conduct rules135 and the sentencing judge’s 
authority to decide the facts pertinent to punishment within the 
maximum statutory range. The Court in Edwards observed, “[o]f 
course, petitioners’ statutory and constitutional claims would make a 
difference if it were possible to argue . . . that the sentences imposed 
exceeded the maximum that the statutes permit for a cocaine-only 
conspiracy.”136 Significantly, the Apprendi Court later quoted this 
language in noting that “[t]he Guidelines are . . . not before the 
Court. We therefore express no view on the subject beyond what this 
Court has already held.”137 Thus, Apprendi seemed to indicate the 
Court’s view that Edwards had addressed the Sixth Amendment 
guidelines issue. 
Subsequently, Harris v. United States sustained a trial judge’s 
postconviction authority to find facts triggering application of a 
statutory mandatory minimum sentence.138 The Court reasoned that, 
in contrast to penalties that raise statutory maximums,139 “[j]udicial 
factfinding in the course of selecting a sentence within the 
authorized range does not implicate the indictment, jury trial, and 
‘reasonable doubt’ components of the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments.”140 At the very least, this post-Apprendi language 
suggests that the application of Blakely to the federal sentencing 
 135. See Edwards, 523 U.S. at 514 (“[R]elevant conduct’ . . . includes both conduct that 
constitutes the ‘offense of conviction,’ and conduct that is ‘part of the same course of conduct 
or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction.” (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted) (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3(a)(1–2) 
(1998))). 
 136. Id. at 515. 
 137. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 497 n.21 (2000) (emphasis added) (citing 
Edwards, 523 U.S. at 515); see also United States v. Emmenegger, No. 04 CR. 334 (GEL), 
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15142, at *35–36 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2004) (“[A]lthough the Court 
has never addressed, with specific reference to the Guidelines, the precise jury trial right 
implicated by Blakely and Apprendi, it has, without a murmur of constitutional qualm, 
previously affirmed sentences that would appear to present the very concerns that some now 
argue invalidate the Guidelines.”). 
 138. 536 U.S. 545, 568–69 (2002). 
 139. The Court stated: “[A mandatory minimum] neither alters the maximum penalty for 
the crime committed nor creates a separate offense calling for a separate penalty; it operates 
solely to limit the sentencing court’s discretion in selecting a penalty within the range already 
available to it without the special finding . . . .” Id. at 559 (emphasis added) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (quoting McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 87–88 (1986)). Of course, 
sentencing guidelines place similar limits on the sentencing court’s discretion. 
 140. Id. at 558 (emphasis added). 
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guidelines is hardly a foregone conclusion—especially since Harris 
also observed: “‘It is not, of course, that anyone today would claim 
that every fact with a bearing on sentencing must be found by a jury; 
we have resolved that general issue and have no intention of 
questioning its resolution.’”141
B. The Differences Between the Washington and the  
Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
The above decisions demonstrate that the Supreme Court has 
always permitted judicial fact-finding for sentencing offenders within 
the statutory maximum.142 The decisions also show that, rather than 
look to the jury’s verdict in each particular case, the Court has 
routinely used the term “statutory maximum” with reference to the 
heaviest potential legislative sanction.143 To the degree that Blakely 
suggests otherwise, it is an aberration that can be best reconciled by 
recognizing important differences between the Washington statutes 
and federal sentencing guidelines. 
1. An overarching federal system 
Unlike Washington’s sentencing scheme, which created 
“dueling” statutory maximum penalties,144 the federal sentencing 
 141. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 248 (1999)). 
The Court further emphasized that the statute at issue “simply took one factor that has always 
been considered by sentencing courts to bear on punishment . . . and dictated the precise weight 
to be given that factor.” Id. at 559 (emphasis added) (omission in original) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (quoting McMillan, 477 U.S. at 89–90). 
 142. Thus, prior to Blakely, every circuit court ruled that Apprendi did not render the 
federal sentencing guidelines unconstitutional because the guidelines operated within the 
statutory maximum. See supra note 103. 
 143. For example, the Harris Court observed: 
Since sentencing ranges came into use, defendants have not been able to predict 
from the face of the indictment precisely what their sentence will be; the charged 
facts have simply made them aware of the “heaviest punishment” they face if 
convicted. Judges, in turn, have always considered uncharged “aggravating 
circumstances” that, while increasing the defendant’s punishment, have not 
“swell[ed] the penalty above what the law has provided for the acts charged.” 
Harris, 536 U.S. at 562 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting 1 BISHOP, supra 
note 88, § 81, at 54); see also United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 632 (2002) (setting 
aside a post-conviction judicial determination and noting that “the indictment’s failure to 
allege a fact, drug quantity, that increased the statutory maximum sentence rendered 
respondents’ enhanced sentences erroneous under the reasoning of Apprendi and Jones”). 
 144. See United States v. Gonzales Magana, No. 98-10487, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 
15759, at *3 (9th Cir. July 29, 2004); Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Beyond Blakely, 16 
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guidelines operate as judicial rules within an overarching statutory 
structure of substantive criminal law.145 In contrast to Washington 
criminal law (e.g., kidnapping), the federal sentencing guidelines do 
not establish degrees of culpability that trigger corresponding 
increases in any statutory maximum. Indeed, the federal sentencing 
guidelines are nonsubstantive in that they neither define criminality 
nor “bind or regulate the primary conduct of the public.”146 Under 
traditional Supreme Court analysis, this omission means the 
guidelines do not constitute elements of criminality.147 Moreover the 
Supreme Court has previously stated that the guidelines do not “vest 
in the Judicial Branch [through the Commission] the legislative 
responsibility for establishing minimum and maximum penalties for 
every crime.”148 In cases of conflict between the federal guidelines 
and the substantive criminal law, statutory text trumps the 
guidelines.149 Thus, the Supreme Court has observed that, rather 
than create new statutory ranges, the guidelines “do no more than 
fetter the discretion of sentencing judges to do what they have done 
FED. SENTENCING REP. (forthcoming), available at http://sentencing.typepad.com/ 
sentencing_law_and_policy/files/kingklein_beyond_blakely.pdf (last visited Sept. 21, 2004) 
[hereinafter Beyond Blakely]. 
 145. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 366, 391 (1989) (“[G]uidelines . . . are court 
rules . . . for carrying into execution judgments that the Judiciary has the power to 
pronounce.”); see also Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 45 (1993) (“[T]he guidelines are 
the equivalent of legislative rules adopted by federal agencies.”). 
 146. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 396; see United States v. Kinter, 235 F.3d 192, 201 (4th Cir. 
2000) (“The Sentencing Guidelines do not create crimes. They merely guide the discretion of 
district courts in determining sentences within a legislatively-determined range, and this 
discretion has been entrusted to the federal courts ‘[f]rom the beginning of the Republic.’” 
(alteration in original) (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 480 n.9 (2000) 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF 
JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 9 (1998)))). 
 147. See, e.g., Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 228 (1998) (noting 
parenthetically that the “definition of a criminal offense [is] entrusted to the legislature, 
‘particularly in the case of federal crimes, which are solely creatures of statute’” (quoting 
Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 604 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 424 (1985)))). Almendarez-Torres v. 
United States also rejected the proposition “that the Constitution requires that most, if not all, 
sentencing factors be treated as elements. But Patterson suggests the exact opposite, namely, 
that the Constitution requires scarcely any sentencing factors to be treated in that way.” Id. at 
241. 
 148. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 396 (emphasis added). 
 149. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 497 n.21 (2000); Edwards v. United 
States, 523 U.S. 511, 515 (1998); supra notes 32, 146, and accompanying text. 
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for generations—impose sentences within the broad limits 
established by Congress.”150
2. Base offense levels, not standard sentencing ranges 
Further, in contrast to Washington’s statutes, the federal 
guidelines do not establish a “standard sentencing range” for each 
crime.151 While each crime carries a corresponding base offense level 
that contains its own sentencing range, that base offense level is only 
a starting point and is subject to adjustment for aggravating or 
mitigating specific offense characteristics.152 Because the guidelines 
contemplate building upon this base offense level to reflect the true 
nature and impact of the offender’s criminal conduct,153 there is no 
legal or logical basis for treating the base offense level as the 
statutory maximum. 
For example, the guidelines set the base offense level for a first-
time fraud conviction at seven, with a corresponding range of zero to 
six months imprisonment.154 Given this penalty structure, Judge 
Gerard Lynch has observed: 
Within the context of the Guidelines, however, it makes little sense 
to say that Congress intended the “statutory maximum” sentence 
 150. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 396. 
 151. In fact, Congress intended that there be “numerous guideline ranges, each range 
describing a somewhat different combination of offender characteristics and office 
circumstances. There would be expected to be, for example, several guideline ranges for a 
single offense varying on the basis of aggravating and mitigating circumstances.” S. REP. NO. 
98-225 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3351. Therefore, Congress directed 
the Commission to develop sentencing ranges applicable for specific categories of offenses 
involving similarly situated defendants, rather than for sentencing ranges for each particular 
crime. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(1) (2000); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1 
(2003); 3 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 526.1 
(Crim. 3d 2004). 
 152. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1 (2003); United States v. Finch, 
282 F.3d 364, 367 (6th Cir. 2002) (“[The] base offense level is the starting point in the 
sentencing computation.”). 
 153. See supra notes 22–24 and accompanying text; cf. United States v. Koch, No. 02-
6278, U.S. App. 2004 WL 1899930, at *6 (6th Cir. Aug. 26, 2004) (“The Guidelines do not 
supply a clear ‘standard sentencing range’ for each defendant and indeed represent a form of 
indeterminate-determinate sentencing because even after application of the hundreds of pages 
of the Guidelines Manual, to say nothing of relevant case law, to each individual defendant’s 
sentence, judges still may increase (or decrease) sentences based on factors not addressed in the 
Guidelines.”). 
 154. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(a)(1) (2003); U.S. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANUAL app. G (2003) (sentencing table); Beyond Blakely, supra note 144. 
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for the crime of wire fraud to be six months rather than the twenty 
years to which Congress, subsequent to the adoption of the 
Sentencing Reform Act [,]. . . increased the actual statutory 
maximum sentence for that crime.155
This is especially true in light of the guidelines’ “modified real 
offense” approach to sentencing, which—subject to the statutory 
maximum—increases penalties based on the defendant’s relevant 
conduct to the crime of conviction.156 Thus, contrary to Justice 
Scalia’s argument in Blakely, there is no “right” to be sentenced at 
the guidelines’ base offense level.157
3. An individualized, rather than presumptive, approach 
The guidelines’ individualized approach to sentencing also sets it 
apart from the Washington sentencing system, which provided a 
generic sentencing range based primarily on the elements of the 
offense of conviction. For example, as Judge Gerard Lynch astutely 
explains: 
Unlike most state penal codes, which frequently divide crimes into 
narrow degrees and standard categories often patterned on the 
highly rationalistic Model Penal Code, federal criminal statutes 
typically cover a vast range of behavior in undifferentiated, very 
general formulations. The wire fraud statute is a classic example of 
such a statute, which quite literally covers a multitude of sins of 
quite different kinds and degrees. Unlike many state guideline 
systems, the federal Guidelines do not set a “standard sentencing 
range” for the crime of wire fraud, or for most other crimes of 
conviction. Rather, the Guidelines provide a methodology for 
assessing the seriousness of different instances of crime, quite 
 155. United States v. Emmenegger, No. 04 CR. 334 (GEL), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
15142, at *50–51 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2004). Similarly, Judge McMahon has observed: 
[I]t seems evident in this day and age of Enron and Sarbanes-Oxley that Congress 
would never have countenanced a Guidelines system in which all first-time 
offenders . . . were limited to a sentence of 0–6 months—the base offense for all 
fraud convictions—without regard to the amount of the fraud, its sophistication, or 
the role played by the defendant in the conspiracy. Such sentences make a mockery 
of the real (not “relevant”) statutory maxima that have been set by the Legislative 
Branch, and effectively eviscerate Congress’s expressed intention . . . .  
United States v. Einstman, 325 F. Supp. 2d 373, 380 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (finding the guidelines 
unconstitutional but declining to hold them severable). 
 156. See supra notes 114–16 and accompanying text. 
 157. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
1GOL3-FIN 11/18/2004 12:08 PM 
935 Sentencing Guidelines After Blakely 
 967 
 
separate from the elements of any particular statutory crime. Where 
it may make sense to think of the 49–53 month “standard 
sentencing range” as the operative ordinary maximum punishment 
for kidnapping in the second degree in Washington, the federal 
Guidelines defy any effort to identify a “standard sentencing range” 
(or a “statutory maximum” other than the one literally provided by 
18 U.S.C. § 1343) for wire fraud. The system simply does not work 
that way.158  
In Blakely, the sentencing judge departed upward from this 
range based upon finding an aggravating factor that distinguished 
second-degree from first-degree kidnapping.159 Consequently, 
although Blakely pleaded guilty to second degree kidnapping, the 
trial court sentenced him almost as severely as if he had been 
convicted of first degree kidnapping.160 This is also comparable to 
the circumstances in Apprendi, in which the defendant pleaded guilty 
to a firearms violation carrying a maximum penalty of ten years 
imprisonment but was sentenced pursuant to an aggravated hate 
crime statute with a twenty-year maximum term.161 The federal 
sentencing guidelines do not permit this result, as the crime of 
conviction always sets the maximum sentence.162 This explains why, 
before Blakely, every circuit ruled that Apprendi did not render the 
federal sentencing guidelines unconstitutional.163
Nor, as Justice Scalia’s majority opinion stated in Blakely, do the 
federal guidelines create a regime 
in which a defendant, with no warning in either his indictment or 
plea, would routinely see his maximum potential sentence balloon 
from as little as five years to as much as life imprisonment . . . based 
not on facts proved to his peers beyond a reasonable doubt, but on 
facts extracted after trial from a report compiled by a probation 
 158. Emmenegger, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15142, at *51–52. 
 159. 124 S. Ct. at 2539. 
 160. The judge in Blakely’s case imposed a sentence of ninety months, only eight months 
short of a sentence for first-degree kidnapping. See id. at 2535. 
 161. See 530 U.S. at 468–69; see also United States v. Pineiro, 377 F.3d 464, 473 n.7 
(5th Cir. 2004) (noting parenthetically that in Apprendi “the effect of the hate-crime 
enhancement was to ‘turn a second-degree offense into a first-degree offense’” (quoting 
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 494 (2000))). 
 162. Edwards v. United States, 523 U.S. 511, 515 (1998) (“[A] maximum sentence set 
by statute trumps a higher sentence set forth in the [Federal Sentencing] Guidelines.”); see also 
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5G1.1(a) (2003). 
 163. See supra note 103. 
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officer who the judge thinks more likely got it right than got it 
wrong.164
To the degree that this practice ever occurred, it originated from 
federal statutes rather than the federal guidelines, which merely 
implemented them.165 More importantly, the Blakely majority’s 
preceding reference to the federal sentencing practice is mistaken. 
Since the Court’s decision in Apprendi, federal courts have required 
prosecutors to allege and prove facts (such as drug type and 
quantity) that expose a defendant to higher statutory maximums.166 
The federal sentencing guidelines, which operate within these 
statutory maximums, therefore are irrelevant to the Blakely Court’s 
concern.167
Thus, neither prior Supreme Court jurisprudence nor the 
concerns that gave rise to Blakely support the proposition that the 
Sixth Amendment requires a jury finding whenever a specific offense 
characteristic adjusts the guidelines’ offense level to produce an 
increased sentencing range within the statutory maximum. 
C. Extending Blakely Would Run Counter to  
History and Common Sense 
Extending Blakely to require jury verdicts for guideline 
enhancements within statutory maximums also runs counter to 
history and common sense. Historically, eighteenth century juries 
 164. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2542 (citation omitted); see also supra note 93. 
 165. Justice Scalia cites 21 U.S.C. § 841, which sets forth the criminal penalties for 
narcotics violations. This statute imposes increasingly lengthy sentences depending on drug 
quantity. As Justice Scalia points out, quantity was often found by the judge post-trial. See, e.g., 
United States v. Chester, No. 91-3059, 1992 WL 63337 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 27, 1992) (“We 
have found that ‘the quantity of drug possessed is not a constituent element of the offense of 
possession with intent to distribute under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a). Quantity is relevant only to 
punishment; the district judge, and not the jury, makes this determination.’” (quoting United 
States v. Patrick, No. 90-3178, slip op. at 6 n.5 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 17, 1992) (citing cases))).  
 166. See, e.g., United States v. Nance, 236 F.3d 820, 824 (7th Cir. 2000) (collecting 
cases). Of course, if Justice Scalia’s principal concern was with the guidelines’ relevant conduct 
rules, the Supreme Court has already endorsed them, and Justice Scalia issued a separate 
concurring opinion to emphasize that the Commission lacked discretion to disregard the 
“character and conduct” of a convicted person. See supra notes 120–30 and accompanying 
text; see also infra note 167.  
 167.  Moreover, to the degree that the guidelines specific offense characteristics might 
produce dramatic sentence increases, courts routinely inform defendants of this possibility at 
the change of plea colloquy. See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, BENCHBOOK FOR U.S. 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGES 71–73 (4th ed. 2000). 
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had little or no occasion to consider sentencing factors because 
criminal violations carried fixed penalties based upon the severity (or 
degree) of the statutory offense.168 When nineteenth-century 
legislatures adopted indeterminate sentencing schemes, judges 
operated with vast discretion to impose any sentence within the 
maximum penalty set by law.169 Further, if judges chose to conduct a 
sentencing hearing, they could consider factors outside the realm of 
evidentiary rules and without burden of proof constraints.170 Indeed, 
the sentencing court did not have to issue formal findings of fact or 
otherwise explain its sentencing decision.171
Of course, unfettered discretion produced widespread disparities, 
which, in turn, prompted Congress to enact the SRA.172 Requiring 
jury verdicts to justify each sentencing enhancement would further 
 168. See ALAN DERSHOWITZ, FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT: REPORT OF THE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING 83 (1976) 
(“punishments were legislatively prescribed with some precision”); Ilene Nagel, Structuring 
Sentencing Discretion: The New Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
883, 892 (1990) (“Each crime had a defined punishment; the period of incarceration was 
generally prescribed with specificity by the legislature.”). Indeed, Virginia “was the first state to 
formally adopt jury sentencing for all criminal offenses,” and this did not occur until 1796. 
Jenia Iontcheva, Jury Sentencing as Democratic Practice, 89 VA. L. REV. 311, 317 (2003). 
Although some scholars take a different view of colonial sentencing statutes, they agree that 
the jury did not play a significant role in sentencing determinations. Professors King and Klein 
have observed: 
As an initial matter, it is doubtful that the setting of penalties was ever as firmly a 
part of the jury’s function in the United States as it was in England. Compared to 
jurors on the other side of the Atlantic, American[s]. . . at the time of the adoption of 
the Bill of Rights played a minor role in sentencing. Instead, many—or perhaps 
most—sentences were set by judges, at their discretion, within broad statutory 
ranges. 
Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Essential Elements, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1467, 1506 (2001) 
(emphasis added); see also Nancy J. King, The Origins of Felony Jury Sentencing in the United 
States, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 937, 937 (2003). But see STITH & CABRANES, supra note 146, 
at 9–10 (distinguishing between state and federal courts—juries had sentencing responsibility 
in the former but not the latter). 
 169. Senators’ Amicus Brief, supra note 17, at 4. 
  During the 19th century and most of the 20th century, federal sentencing was 
generally conducted pursuant to an intermediate system. For most offenses, 
Congress proscribed a range of punishment that could be imposed for an individual 
convicted of a particular offense, but judges were free to impose a sentence 
anywhere within that statutory range based on the consideration of virtually any 
information that a court deemed relevant . . . . 
Id. 
 170. See id. at 4–6; see also, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363 (1989). 
 171. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 363. 
 172. See S. REP. NO. 98-223, supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
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reduce judicial discretion under the federal guidelines. Consider an 
offender, utterly without remorse, who states his intent to remain in 
contact with gang members and to “have nothing to do with the 
laws of society.” Suppose further that the probation office delivers a 
devastating victim impact statement to the judge. The district court 
might properly consider such circumstances sufficiently egregious to 
warrant an upward departure from the applicable guideline range, 
and should retain authority to impose punishment accordingly.173 
Decisions of this kind are usually not suitable for jury 
determinations; this information is rarely available prior to 
conviction, and in any event, jurors lack the judge’s experience in 
evaluating how this offender’s uniquely negative qualities compare 
with other more ordinary or conciliatory violators.174
Of course, the practical need to allow judges authority to 
increase penalties (within the statutory maximum) is not without 
limits. And contrary to Justice Scalia’s opinion in Blakely,175 judges 
are well equipped to prevent the guidelines from becoming “‘a tail 
which wags the dog of the substantive offense.’”176 Justice Scalia 
considered the dissent’s canine reference too vague for meaningful 
 173. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.0–2.9 (2003) (listing 
appropriate grounds for upward departures); see also United States v. Simmons, 368 F.3d 
1335, 1340 (11th Cir. 2004) (“While the Guidelines address several of the most common 
characteristics of offenses and defendants, there is an almost endless variety of other 
circumstances or considerations that might warrant upward departures.” (citing and quoting 
parenthetically U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A(4)(b) (2001) (“[I]t is 
difficult to prescribe a single set of guidelines that encompasses the vast range of human 
conduct potentially relevant to a sentencing decision.”))).  
Courts use their discretion in imposing upward departures where appropriate. See, e.g., 
United States v. Courtney, 362 F.3d 497, 503–04 (8th Cir. 2004) (infliction of extreme 
psychological harm to the defendant’s victims, as shown in victim-impact statements (citing 
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2N1.1, cmt.1)); United States v. Melgar-Galvez, 
161 F.3d 1122, 1124 (7th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he defendant has continually demonstrated a 
propensity to violate the laws of this country [and] reveals a clear and uncompromising 
recidivist type of criminal nature which we agree certainly should be subject to upward 
departure.”); United States v. Damico, 99 F.3d 1431, 1439 (7th Cir. 1996) (involvement with 
organized crime); United States v. Akindele, 84 F.3d 948, 952–53 (7th Cir. 1996) (degree of 
victim harm); United States v. Lara-Banda, 972 F.2d 958, 960 (8th Cir. 1992) (defendant was 
unrepentant, incorrigible, and posed a risk to the community). 
 174. Cf. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 98 (1996) (noting that the district court is 
“informed by its vantage point and day-to-day experience in criminal sentencing” and has “an 
institutional advantage . . . in making these sorts of determinations”). 
 175. 124 S. Ct. at 2542 n.13. 
 176. United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 156–57 n.2 (1997) (quoting McMillan, 477 
U.S. at 88); see Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2560 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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due process analysis.177 But this metaphor, which the Supreme Court 
has previously employed,178 simply expresses the principle that due 
process does not permit sentencing factors to produce penalties 
grossly disproportionate to the crime of conviction. Justice Scalia’s 
majority opinion seems to demand a definitive rule where a less 
exacting standard should suffice. Judges routinely apply standards, 
rather than rules, in resolving constitutional questions.179 In 
particular, American courts have applied the proportionality principle 
to a wide range of situations, including Eighth Amendment claims of 
cruel and unusual punishment,180 excessive fines,181 and the propriety 
 177. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2542 n.13. 
 178. See, e.g., Watts, 519 U.S. at 156–57 n.2 (citations omitted); McMillan, 477 U.S. at 
88; Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 243–44 (1998). 
 179.  For example, in a First Amendment context, “the Court’s movement away from 
large categories towards adjudication based on individual cases may be characterized as a move 
from ‘rules’ to ‘standards.’” G. Robert Blakey & Brian J. Murray, Threats, Free Speech, and the 
Jurisprudence of the Federal Criminal Law, 2002 BYU L. REV. 829, 920 n.231. That standards 
are less definite than rules does not render standards meaningless. Blakey and Murray note 
Justice Holmes’s observation: “The law is administered by able and experienced men, who 
know too much to sacrifice good sense to a syllogism.” Id. at 1121 (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Natural Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 
31, 32 (1920). In the context of criminal procedure, the Supreme Court has similarly preferred 
standards over absolute rules. See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230–31 (1982) 
(rejecting a rigid test for probable cause determinations in favor of a totality-of-the-
circumstances standard); Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 112–13 (1977) (“The standard, 
after all, is that of fairness as required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.” (rejecting a per se exclusion of improper eyewitness identifications and adopting 
a totality-of-the-circumstances approach)). Although in Miranda v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 1 
(1964), the Court initially opted for a per se prophylactic rule in the context of custodial 
interrogations, “neither the Supreme Court nor the lower courts have generally taken a rigid 
approach in the application of Miranda.” WAYNE R. LAFAVE, ET AL. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
340 (4th ed. 2004). 
 180. See, e.g., JOSEPH G. COOK, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED § 26.3 
(3rd ed. 1996) (reviewing Eighth Amendment jurisprudence addressing allegedly 
disproportionate sentences); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 3.5(f) at 176–80 (4th ed. 
2003) (reviewing similar jurisprudence concerning disproportionate sentences); see also, e.g., 
Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 20 (2003) (applying a “narrow” proportionality review to 
California’s three strikes law); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (applying 
proportionality review to the execution of the mentally disabled); United States v. Bajakajian, 
524 U.S. 321, 333 (1998) (applying proportionality review under the Excessive Fines Clause 
to a federal forfeiture statute); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 997 (1991) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (applying a “narrow” proportionality 
review to a state law imposing a life sentence for certain drug possession offenses); Solem v. 
Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 291 (1983) (applying proportionality review to South Dakota’s 
recidivism statute); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982) (applying proportionality 
review to a capital sentence for a certain felony murder conviction); Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 
370, 374 & n.3 (1982) (applying proportionality review to a forty-year sentence for possession 
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of punitive damages in civil cases.182 Several decisions have already 
applied this metaphor to guidelines cases,183 and a more definitive 
standard would likely develop as federal common law continues to 
address this issue.184 For example, notwithstanding the difficulty 
inherent in resolving claims of disproportionality, the Supreme Court 
has developed criteria to assist in this analysis for Eighth Amendment 
claims.185
Reliance on due process protections is especially attractive 
relative to the evidentiary issues and sentencing options likely to 
emerge if the Supreme Court rules that Blakely renders the federal 
with intent to distribute nine ounces of marijuana); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980) 
(applying proportionality review to Texas’s recidivism statute); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 
584, 592 (1977) (“We . . . conclude[] that a sentence of death is grossly disproportionate and 
excessive punishment for the crime of rape and is therefore forbidden by the Eighth 
Amendment as cruel and unusual punishment.”); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) 
(applying proportionality review to a sentence of ninety days in jail for the crime of being 
addicted to narcotics); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 365–68, 371, 380–81 (1910) 
(applying proportionality review to a Philippine law requiring punishment of twelve to twenty 
years hard labor for the offense of falsification by a public official). 
 181. COOK, supra note 180, at § 26.11; see also Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 334–37; Austin 
v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 622–23 (1993). 
 182. See, e.g., B.M.W. of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996); see also PROSSER & 
KEETON ON TORTS § 2, at 7–15 (W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984). 
 183. See United States v. Rebman, 321 F.3d 540, 545 (6th Cir. 2003) (declining to 
impose sentence “for a homicide under the guise of a guilty plea to the distribution of a very 
small quantity of drugs”); United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1100–01 (3rd Cir. 
1990); United States v. Martinez, 234 F. Supp. 80, 88, 90–91 (D. Mass. 2002). Further, 
other courts have applied a proportionality analysis in requiring clear and convincing evidence 
when sentencing factors produce dramatically higher penalties. See United States v. Lynch, 367 
F.3d 1148, 1162 (9th Cir. 2004); Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1102; see also supra note 115. 
 184. As Judge Lynch has observed in a comparable context: 
While some judges might find drawing the line . . . uncomfortably subjective, most 
of those who have sat on the Supreme Court throughout its history would find such 
an exercise the essence of the judicial role, much like distinguishing between 
reasonable and unreasonable searches, cruel and not-so-cruel punishments, speedy 
and unduly delayed trials, or reasonable and unreasonable time, place, and manner 
restrictions on freedom of speech, among many other examples. Such line-drawing, 
even if at the borders it must inevitably draw on the individual judgment of 
appointed judges, is infinitely preferable to applying formulaic rules in defiance of 
common sense or practical effect. 
United States v. Emmenegger, No. 04 Cr. 334 (GEL), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15142, at *47 
n.16 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2004). 
 185. Compare Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290–92 (1983) (identifying criteria), with 
Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 72 (2003) (acknowledging that “[a] gross 
disproportionality principle is applicable to sentences for terms of years,” but stating that 
“[o]ur cases exhibit a lack of clarity regarding what factors may indicate gross 
disproportionality”). 
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guidelines unconstitutional. From an evidentiary standpoint, 
applying Blakely to the federal guidelines would dramatically change 
charging practices and proof at trial, as the guidelines’ specific 
offense characteristics would be transformed into statutory elements 
that prosecutors must plead and prove. In addition to increasing the 
risk of retroactive application (thereby provoking an unprecedented 
volume of filings for post-conviction relief),186 this will inevitably 
 186. Justice O’Connor’s dissenting opinion in Blakely argued that even if Ring v. 
Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 608 (2002) (holding that Apprendi requires that aggravating factors 
necessary for the imposition of the death penalty be found by a jury, rather than a judge), 
“does not apply retroactively on habeas review, all criminal sentences imposed under the 
federal and state guidelines since Apprendi was decided in 2000 arguably remain open to 
collateral attack.” Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2549 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O’Connor 
based her observation on the Supreme Court’s decision in Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 
2519, 2523 (2004), which declined to give Apprendi and Ring retroactive effect. Blakely, 124 
S. Ct. at 2549 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). She implied that habeas petitioners could argue 
that, given Apprendi, the Blakely decision may not be characterized as a “new rule,” and 
should, therefore, apply retroactively at least to the date of the Apprendi decision. Id. In fact, a 
decision invalidating the federal sentencing guidelines (as applied) could have a far greater 
retroactive application than Justice O’Connor may have realized. Essentially, even if the Court 
decides its decision constitutes a new rule, the Blakely rule should be treated as a substantive 
change and therefore receive full retroactive application.  
In Schriro, Justice Scalia explained that “[n]ew substantive rules generally apply 
retroactively. . . . Such rules apply retroactively because they ‘necessarily carry a significant risk 
that a defendant stands convicted of “an act that the law does not make criminal” or faces a 
punishment that the law cannot impose upon him.’” 124 S. Ct. at 2522–23 (second emphasis 
added) (quoting Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620 (1988) (quoting Davis v. 
United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346 (1974))). “New rules of procedure, on the other hand, 
generally do not apply retroactively.” Id. at 2523. Justice Scalia further observed: “A decision 
that modifies the elements of an offense is normally substantive rather than procedural. New 
elements alter the range of conduct the statute punishes.” Id. at 2524. Thus, for example, 
when the Supreme Court issued McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 358 (1987), which 
modified the definition of mail fraud to exclude certain political corruption cases, the decision 
applied retroactively to sentences imposed for mail fraud before McNally was decided (even to 
cases on collateral review). See United States v. Mitchell, 867 F.2d 1232, 1233 (9th Cir. 1989) 
(“We agree . . . that McNally is fully retroactive . . . .” (citing United States v. Shelton, 848 
F.2d 1485, 1488–90 (10th Cir. 1988) (en banc); Ingber v. Enzor, 841 F.2d 450, 453–54 (2d 
Cir. 1988))). 
Apprendi treated certain sentencing factors as “the functional equivalent of an element 
of a greater offense than the one covered by the jury’s guilty verdict.” 530 U.S. at 494 n.19. 
Although the Schriro Court concluded that Ring and Apprendi announced only new 
procedural rules and, thus, did not have retroactive effect to cases no longer on direct review, 
Schriro was only a 5–4 decision. 124 S. Ct. at 2522–23, 2526. Moreover, Blakely.’s impact on 
the federal sentencing guidelines may be substantive rather than procedural, thereby triggering 
broader retroactive effect. Specifically, if the Supreme Court’s analysis in its pending cases 
suggests that the federal sentencing guidelines are the functional equivalent of statutory 
elements, its decision would effectively redefine the crime of conviction. Justice Scalia’s 
burglary example in Blakely illustrates this point, as it recognizes burglary committed with a 
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create new problems at trial. For example, if the Supreme Court, in 
effect, finds that the federal criminal code also includes the 
guidelines’ specific offense characteristics that potentially increase a 
defendant’s sentence within the statutory maximum, jury 
instructions incorporating both federal substantive law and the 
guidelines’ provisions will become numbingly complex.187
Questions of evidentiary prejudice will also arise in almost every 
case. For example, subject to narrow exceptions, the Federal Rules of 
Evidence do not permit prosecutors to admit evidence of a 
defendant’s prior misconduct.188 However, if a prosecutor is required 
to allege relevant conduct factors in an indictment, he is entitled to 
prove them irrespective of their potentially prejudicial effect on the 
defendant.189 Of course, the judge may bifurcate the trial, thereby 
deferring relevant conduct and other specific offense characteristics 
to the sentencing stage of the proceedings. But problems of this kind 
would mean that countless cases would require bifurcation.190 The 
gun (i.e., in effect, aggravated burglary, for which the statutory sentence would be forty years) 
as distinct from burglary committed without a gun (for which the maximum possible sentence 
would be ten years). Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2540. Despite any legislative labels designating gun 
possession during the burglary as a sentencing element, the Blakely majority would conclude 
that gun possession is the functional equivalent of a substantive element that must be found by 
a jury. Id.  
If Blakely is construed as redefining the statutory elements of the crime of conviction to 
include sentencing factors—“the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense than 
the one covered by the jury’s guilty verdict,” Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494 n.19—then 
defendants whose sentences were enhanced under guideline factors could make a colorable 
argument that what the sentencing guidelines had designated as aggravating factors subject to 
judicial fact-finding should be considered elements, or the functional equivalent of elements, of 
the substantive offense for which they were convicted and thus, that Blakely announced a new 
substantive rule under Schriro. See Schriro, 124 S. Ct. at 2524. As such, Blakely could have 
broad retroactive application. Id. at 2522–23.  
 187. See supra note 158. 
 188. FED. R. EVID. 404; see also Michael Goldsmith, Resurrecting RICO: Removing 
Immunity for White-Collar Crime, 41 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 281, 286 n.29 (2004) (collecting 
sources). 
 189. For example, in RICO cases, prosecutors are required to prove the pattern and 
enterprise elements. Because the indictment must include these allegations, prosecutors are 
naturally given leeway to prove them. Such proof, which is very damaging to the defense, is 
ordinarily deemed too prejudicial to admit in non-RICO cases. Goldsmith, supra note 188, at 
286 n.27. 
 190. See U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Use of Guidelines and Specific Offense Characteristics: 
FY 2002 (compiling data on the application of specific offence characteristics to a substantial 
number of sentences); See also, e.g., Jeffrey Standen, The End of the Era of Sentencing 
Guidelines: Apprendi v. New Jersey, 87 IOWA L. REV. 775, 783, 793–94 (2002) (discussing 
whether relevant conduct could be considered an element of the crime under Apprendi and 
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Supreme Court surely does not want bifurcated criminal trials to 
become the norm in federal court.191
Of course, these problems could be avoided if Congress simply 
reverts to the purely discretionary, indeterminate sentencing system 
that preceded the guidelines for more than two hundred years.192 But 
this almost certainly will not occur, given the many well-documented 
problems associated with that approach.193 Instead, political pressure 
to ensure higher penalties will likely produce a more severe, 
determinate sentencing system.194 Ironically, the Blakely decision 
readily permits that result. 
concluding that if it is, courts could expect to see motions for bifurcation for those sentences 
based, even in part, on relevant conduct). If Professor Standen’s conclusions about bifurcation 
were right for Apprendi, they are even more correct under Blakely. 
 191. On the contrary, the Court has shown considerable concern for preserving the 
efficiency of the trial process. Cf. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 416–17 (1980) 
(noting “the importance of trial by jury and the need to husband the resources necessary for 
that process” and characterizing the case as “a good example of the potential for wasting 
valuable trial resources”). 
 192. See supra notes 14–16 and accompanying text. It bears repeating that such systems 
require no specific fact-finding. 
 193. See supra notes 14–17 and accompanying text. Indeed, there is little evidence that 
federal judges themselves want to reinstate the pre-guidelines system. See, e.g., United States v. 
Emmenegger, No. 04 Cr. 334 (GEL), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15142, at *25 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 
4, 2004) (“After nearly two decades of Guideline sentencing . . . it is doubtful that any federal 
court would be comfortable wielding such extraordinary discretion.”). 
 194. As an example of such pressure, James K. Vine, United States Attorney for the 
Middle District of Tennessee, wrote an opinion piece in a local newspaper arguing that tough 
mandatory minimum sentencing laws are responsible for “a 30-year low” in crime rates and 
encouraging resistance to calls to repeal mandatory minimums. James K. Vine, Nashville Eye: 
Current Sentencing Policy Protects Safety of Americans, TENNESSEAN, Aug. 3, 2004, at 9A. The 
Tennessean later reported that despite Vine’s claims that the opinion piece was developed 
primarily in his office, “Sandy Mattice, the U.S. attorney for Tennessee’s Eastern District, 
submitted an Aug. 11 article to The Chattanooga Times-Free Press that was nearly identical to 
Vine’s Tennessean offering. Another article published in a Guam newspaper by a federal 
prosecutor there also featured many of the same passages, phrasing and transitions.” Rob 
Johnson, Opinion Piece Came from Local Office, Attorney Contends, TENNESSEAN, Aug. 21, 
2004. An article in The Knoxville News-Sentinel suggests that having local United States 
Attorneys submit editorials defending mandatory minimums was part of a Justice Department 
“counteroffensive” aimed at responding to the American Bar Association’s recent call to repeal 
mandatory minimum sentencing. Jamie Satterfield, DOJ Responds to Minimum Sentence 
Dissenters, KNOXVILLE NEWS-SENTINEL, Aug. 18, 2004, at B1. Satterfield quotes Mattice as 
admitting that the article “was based on a ‘model’ piece drafted ‘by committee’ within the 
Justice Department.” Id. In any event, it is clear that the Department of Justice is willing to 
encourage continued support for mandatory minimums. See also Orrin Hatch, The Role of 
Congress in Sentencing: The United States Sentencing Commission, Mandatory Minimum 
Sentences, and the Search for a Certain and Effective Sentencing System, 28 WAKE FOREST L. 
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IV. LIFE WITHOUT THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES: THE 
SUPREME COURT’S GUIDE TO HIGHER SENTENCES 
Blakely ostensibly vindicates the Sixth Amendment right to a jury 
trial and proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. However, the 
Court’s analysis leaves ample room for a more draconian sentencing 
system with fewer constitutional protections. Two features of Blakely 
create this potential. First, the majority opinion confirmed prior case 
law establishing that the Court’s Sixth Amendment analysis does not 
apply to sentencing factors that trigger mandatory minimum 
penalties.195 Second, Blakely’s rationale does not apply to factors that 
mitigate, rather than aggravate, punishment. 
A. Mandatory Minimums 
Prior to Blakely, the Supreme Court issued two decisions 
sustaining the judge’s authority to make factual findings attendant to 
mandatory minimum sentences. In McMillan v. Pennsylvania,196 the 
Court sustained a state statute that provided a “mandatory minimum 
sentence of five years’ imprisonment if the sentencing judge finds, by 
a preponderance of the evidence, that the person ‘visibly possessed a 
firearm during the commission of the offense.’”197 The Court 
reasoned that due process does not require a jury finding of guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt because the Pennsylvania legislature 
treated visible possession as a sentencing enhancement rather than an 
element of the offense of conviction.198 McMillan stated that 
“[s]entencing courts necessarily consider the circumstances of an 
offense in selecting the appropriate punishment, and we have 
consistently approved sentencing schemes that mandate 
consideration of facts related to the crime . . . without suggesting 
that those facts must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”199 
REV. 185, 192–98 (1993) (discussing the history of mandatory minimum sentencing and 
some alternatives to mandatory minimums). 
 195. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2540. 
 196. 477 U.S. 79 (1986). 
 197. Id. at 81; see also King & Klein, Essential Elements, supra note 168, at 1506. 
 198. Id. at 85–86. 
 199. Id. at 92 (citation omitted). McMillan stated that “petitioners do not and could not 
claim that a sentencing court may never rely on a particular fact . . . without finding that fact 
by ‘clear and convincing evidence.’” Id. at 91; see also supra note 106 and accompanying text 
(noting unanimous circuit approval of dangerous special offender enhancements under a 
preponderance of the evidence standard pursuant to judicial fact-finding). 
1GOL3-FIN 11/18/2004 12:08 PM 
935 Sentencing Guidelines After Blakely 
 977 
 
Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion stated that the Pennsylvania 
mandatory minimum “operates solely to limit the sentencing court’s 
discretion in selecting a penalty within the range already available to 
it without the special finding of visible possession of a firearm.”200 
The Court also stated that petitioners’ claim “would have at least 
more superficial appeal if a finding of visible possession exposed 
them to greater or additional punishment.”201
In Harris v. United States,202 the Supreme Court subsequently 
rebuffed a claim that Apprendi had implicitly overruled McMillan:203
[T]he [McMillan] Court noted that the . . . [mandatory minimum] 
statute “simply took one factor that has always been considered by 
sentencing courts to bear on punishment . . . and dictated the 
precise weight to be given that factor.” 
 That reasoning still controls. If the facts judges consider when 
exercising their discretion within the statutory range are not 
elements, they do not become [elements] merely because 
legislatures require the judge to impose a minimum sentence when 
those facts are found . . . .204
In Blakely, the Court applied this line of analysis to distinguish 
mandatory minimum statutes from the Washington law found 
unconstitutional.205 Blakely thereby confirms that mandatory 
minimum statutes operate outside the protection of the Sixth 
Amendment jury trial and burden of proof requirements. Not 
surprisingly, Congress has already heard one proposal premised on 
this rationale.206
 200. Id. at 88. 
 201. Id. (emphasis added). 
 202. 536 U.S. 545 (2002). 
 203. Id. at 556–57 (“McMillan and Apprendi are consistent . . . .”). 
 204. Id. at 559–60 (citations omitted). 
 205. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2538. 
 206. See Blakely v. Washington and the Federal Sentencing System: Hearing Before the 
Senate Judiciary Committee, 108th Cong. (July 13, 2004), available at 
http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=1260&wit_id=647 (testimony of Frank 
Bowman) (proposing to “raise the top of guideline ranges to the statutory maximum” and 
noting that Blakely and McMillan support the constitutionality of this approach); see also Nancy 
J. King & Susan R. Klein, Apres Apprendi, 12 FED. SENTENCING REP. 331 (2000). 
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B. Potential Congressional Responses 
Even if Congress chooses not to enact widespread mandatory 
minimums, Blakely’s analysis creates ample opportunity for increasing 
sentences. For example, as Blakely apparently applies only to factors 
that potentially increase sentences,207 mitigating factors fall outside 
its scope. This is consistent with the Supreme Court’s traditional 
treatment of mitigating factors.208
With this in mind, Congress could stiffen penalties by (1) 
increasing the base offense level for a targeted crime; (2) converting 
its specific offense characteristics into mitigating factors; and (3) 
imposing on the defense the burden of proving these mitigating 
factors.209 For example, in Patterson v. New York, the Supreme Court 
upheld a New York statute that defined second-degree murder as an 
intentional killing and placed upon the defendant the burden of 
proving an affirmative defense (“extreme emotional disturbance”) to 
reduce the crime to manslaughter.210 The Court reasoned that due 
process only requires the State to prove each element of a crime 
beyond a reasonable doubt; consequently “if the State . . . chooses to 
recognize a factor that mitigates the degree of criminality or 
punishment, . . . the State may assure itself that the fact has been 
established with reasonable certainty.”211
 207. See supra notes 77–86 and accompanying text; see also Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 
U.S. 466, 501 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[A] ‘crime’ includes every fact that is by law 
a basis for imposing or increasing punishment (in contrast with a fact that mitigates 
punishment).”). 
 208. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 491 n.16 (“[T]he Court has often recognized . . . [the 
distinction] between facts in aggravation of punishment and facts in mitigation.”) (citations 
omitted). 
 209. The Apprendi majority reasoned that political pressures would deter such legislative 
measures. Id. On the contrary, political pressure is usually exerted to increase penalties. See, 
e.g., Nora V. Demleitner, Symposium: Legal Issues and Sociolegal Consequences of the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines: First Peoples, First Principles: The Sentencing Commission’s Obligation to 
Reject False Images of Criminal Offenders, 87 IOWA L. REV. 563 (2002) (discussing political 
pressures on state sentencing commissions to increase penalties for sexual offenders). 
Moreover, the proposal in the text is less severe than the alternative of new mandatory 
minimums. 
 210. 432 U.S. 197, 206–07 (1977). 
 211. Id. at 209. The Court also quoted extensively Chief Judge Breitel’s concurring 
opinion from the New York State Court of Appeals: 
  Nevertheless, although one should guard against such abuses, it may be 
misguided, out of excess caution, to forestall or discourage the use of affirmative 
defenses, where defendant may have the burden of proof but no greater than by a 
preponderance of the evidence. In the absence of affirmative defenses the impulse to 
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Under this reasoning, for example, Congress could reconfigure 
the fraud guideline as follows: (1) increase the base offense level 
from seven to thirty-seven, which would set the penalty at the 
twenty-year statutory maximum; (2) designate the absence of current 
specific offense characteristics as mitigating factors warranting a 
reduction corresponding with the weight historically assigned to 
each such factor;212 and (3) place the burden of proving mitigation 
on the defendant. 
Of course, the Patterson court acknowledged constitutional 
limits on the government’s authority to reallocate burdens of proof 
“by labeling as affirmative defenses at least some elements of the 
crimes now defined in . . . statutes.”213 However, this constraint 
would not apply to the guidelines’ mitigating adjustments and 
specific offense characteristics, which are not statutory elements. 
legislators, especially in periods of concern about the rise of crime, would be to define 
particular crimes in unqualifiedly general terms, and leave only to sentence the 
adjustment between offenses of lesser and greater degree. In times when there is also a 
retrogressive impulse in legislation to restrain courts by mandatory sentences, the evil 
would be compounded. 
  The affirmative defense, intelligently used, permits the gradation of offenses at 
the earlier stages of the prosecution and certainly at the trial, and thus offers the 
opportunity to a defendant to allege or prove . . . the distinction between the 
offense charge and the mitigating circumstances which should ameliorate the degree 
or kind of offense. . . . 
  In sum, the appropriate use of affirmative defenses enlarge the ameliorative 
aspects of a statutory scheme for the punishment of crime rather than the other way 
around – a shift from primitive mechanical classifications based on the bare antisocial 
act and its consequences rather than on the nature of the offender and the 
conditions which produce some degree of excuse for his conduct. 
Id. at 211–12 n.13 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting People v. 
Patterson, 347 N.E.2d 898, 909–10 (N.Y. 1976)). Viewed in this light, the federal sentencing 
guidelines serve an ameliorative function akin to affirmative defenses. Relative to mandatory 
minimums, for example, this is especially true. 
 212. For example, starting with an offense level of thirty-seven, the guidelines could 
authorize the following reductions for mitigating factors: if the offense involved fewer than ten 
victims, decrease by two levels, U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b)(2); if the 
offense did not involve “theft from the person of another,” decrease two levels, id. § 
2B1.1(b)(3); if the offense did not involve a misrepresentation that the offender “was acting 
on behalf of a charitable organization,” decrease by two levels, id. § 2B1.1(b)(7)); if the 
defendant did not “relocate[], or participate[] in relocating a fraudulent scheme to another 
jurisdiction to evade law enforcement,” decrease by two levels, id. § 2B1.1(b)(8)); if the 
offense did not involve “production or trafficking of any unauthorized . . . counterfeit . . . 
device,” decrease by two levels, id. § 1B.1.1(b)(9)); if the loss was less than $5,000, decrease 
by twenty levels, id. § 2B1.1(b)(1)). This calculation would produce a thirty-level reduction to 
a base offense level of seven and a corresponding sentencing range of zero to six months. 
 213. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977).  
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Rather than defining any crimes, mitigating adjustments and specific 
offense characteristics merely assign specified weights to certain 
factors that reduce punishment due to the way in which the crime 
occurred.214
The foregoing examples demonstrate that applying Blakely to the 
federal guidelines will probably not produce an era of enlightened 
sentencing reform. Thus, whatever their flaws, the federal sentencing 
guidelines are preferable to their most likely alternatives. Indeed, at 
least one federal judge has wisely concluded that Churchill’s adage 
about democracy also applies to the federal guideline system: “It is 
the worst possible way to sentence a defendant, except for all the 
others.”215 With this in mind, the Supreme Court should not apply 
unprecedented constitutional analysis to invalidate them. 
V. CONCLUSION 
As a former commissioner, I acknowledge that the federal 
sentencing guidelines are imperfect. But they also have their virtues, 
and, in any event, their flaws do not render them unconstitutional. 
The guidelines have reduced unwarranted sentencing disparity.216 
They provide a measure of predictability in sentencing,217 ensuring 
 214. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2X1.1(b) (2003) (reduction for 
incomplete attempt); id. § 3B1.2 (downward adjustment for “mitigating role”). Amendment 2 
of the 2003–04 Amendment Cycle modifies § 2G2.2(b)(1) of the guidelines such that a 
reduction for possession of, rather than trafficking in, child pornography “is warranted, if the 
defendant establishes that there was no intent to distribute the material.” 69 Fed. Reg. 28,994, 
29,006 (May 19, 2004). 
 215. Judge Stuart Dalzell, One Cheer for the Guidelines, 40 VILL. L. REV. 317, 334 
(1995); see WINSTON CHURCHILL, THE WIT AND WISDOM OF WINSTON CHURCHILL 28 
(James C. Humes ed., HarperPerennial 1995); see also, e.g., Paul G. Cassell, Too Severe?: A 
Defense of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (And a Critique of Federal Mandatory Minimums), 
56 STAN. L. REV. 1017, 1017 (2004). 
 216. For example: “In 2002, there was no statistically significant effect from race and 
ethnicity on sentencing length. When we control for effects of legally relevant factors such as 
mandatory minimums, race and ethnicity likewise show no substantial effect on sentencing 
today.” Telephone Interview with Paul J. Hofer, Senior Research Associate, U.S. Sentencing 
Commission (Aug. 26, 2004); see also Paul J. Hofer, Kevin R. Blackwell & R. Barry Ruback, 
The Effect of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines on Inter-Judge Sentencing Disparity, 90 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 239, 288–89 (1999) (discussing study finding that guidelines reduced 
interjudge disparity); James M. Anderson, Jeffrey R. Kling & Kate Stith, Measuring Interjudge 
Sentencing Disparity: Before and After the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON. 271 
(1999) (same). 
 217. See generally Goldsmith & Gibson, The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines: A Surprising 
Success, supra note 55.  
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an open process in which offenders can know the basis for their 
sentence and have the right to appeal erroneous applications.218 
Relative to mandatory minimums, the guidelines also permit judges 
to retain at least some sentencing discretion, including the ability to 
depart in exceptional circumstances. 
Of course, these virtues do not necessarily ensure the guidelines’ 
constitutionality, and I recognize that the defense bar seeks to 
invalidate them. Indeed, Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Blakely 
emphasized this point.219 Blakely, however, renders the federal 
guidelines unconstitutional only if the Supreme Court is willing to 
disregard more than two decades of its own jurisprudence as well as 
critical features that distinguish these guidelines from the statutes in 
both Blakely and Apprendi. To guideline opponents who choose to 
ignore these distinctions in the hope of promoting sentencing 
reform, I respectfully suggest that “when the gods wish to punish us, 















 218. 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (2003). 
 219. 124 S. Ct. at 2542 (referencing the position of amicus brief of the National 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers). 
 220. OSCAR WILDE, AN IDEAL HUSBAND, act 2 (1895), reprinted in PLAYS, PROSE 
WRITING AND POEMS 329, 361 (Anthony Fothergill ed., Everyman 1996) (Sir Robert 
Chiltern speaking to Lord Goring). Wilde also wrote: “In this world there are only two 
tragedies. One is not getting what one wants, and the other is getting it. The last is much the 
worst . . . .” OSCAR WILDE, LADY WINDERMERE’S FAN, act 3, sc. 3 (1892), reprinted in 
PLAYS, PROSE WRITING AND POEMS 167, 210 (Anthony Fothergill ed., Everyman 1996) 
(Dumby speaking to Lord Darlington); cf. Bowman, supra note 31, at 732 (warning critics to 
“be careful what you wish for because you might get it”). 
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